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Plato on Pleasures Mixed with Pains: An Asymmetrical Account 
 
Scholarly opinion regarding the relation between the various treatments of pleasure 
within the Platonic corpus tends to focus on the ways in which the Philebus advances 
beyond Plato’s earlier views, this dialogue’s own problems notwithstanding. This 
assessment is, to a large extent, justified: the Philebus does, in many ways, advance 
well beyond what precedes it. It is the most detailed and sophisticated account of 
pleasure that Plato puts forward. The observations that even bodily desire belongs to 
the soul, and that pleasure may have truth-value as a propositional attitude, for 
instance, clearly reflect a greater degree of sophistication about desire and pleasure. 
But the undeniable progress seems to have obscured the lines of continuity between the 
relevant dialogues, and the debt of the later works to the earlier ones has not been 
sufficiently appreciated.1    
                                                
This paper was written, in large part, during a semester I spent at the University of St 
Andrews as a visiting scholar. I am thankful to Eastern Mediterranean University for 
granting me a research leave, to the European Union Scholarship Programme for 
funding the semester, and to the University of St Andrews, School of Classics, for their 
hospitality. Various versions of this paper were presented at King’s College, London, 
the University of St Andrews, and the B Club at the University of Cambridge. I am 
thankful, for their valuable comments, to the audiences at these gatherings, in 
particular Gábor Betegh, Sarah Broadie, Nicholas Denyer, Stephen Halliwell, Fiona 
Leigh, Alex Long, David Sedley, Matthew Shelton, Robert Wardy, and James Warren. 
I am especially grateful to Joachim Aufderheide and Anthony Price for a helpful 
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discussion and generous written comments on the paper. The paper also benefited from 
comments by two anonymous referees. Finally, I am indebted to the editor, Victor 
Caston, whose insightful comments and suggestions were very helpful in revising the 
paper and preparing the final version. 
1 The high regard in which the Philebus is held is generally coupled with a dismissive 
treatment of Plato’s views in his earlier works, especially in the much-maligned 
Republic 9. The received view takes the Philebus to offer a vastly superior account of 
pleasure than Republic 9 because the earlier work was inferior not merely relatively, 
but inferior simpliciter, as it were. See, for instance, N. R. Murphy, The Interpretation 
of Plato’s Republic (Oxford, 1951); R. C. Cross and A. D. Woozley, Plato’s Republic: 
A Philosophical Commentary (London, 1964); J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor, 
The Greeks on Pleasure [Greeks] (Oxford, 1982); D. Frede, ‘Rumpelstiltskin’s 
Pleasures: True and False Pleasures in Plato’s Philebus’ [‘Rumpelstiltskin’], 
Phronesis, 30 (1985), 151-80; D. Frede, ‘Disintegration and Restoration: Pleasure and 
Pain in Plato’s Philebus’, in R. Kraut (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato 
(Cambridge, 1992), 425-63 at 455; M. McPherran, ‘Love and Medicine in Plato’s 
Symposium and Philebus’, in J. Dillon and L. Brisson (eds.), Plato’s Philebus, Selected 
Papers from the Eighth Symposium Platonicum (Sankt Augustin, 2010), 204-8, at 208; 
and J. Whiting, ‘Fools’ Pleasures in Plato’s Philebus’ [‘Fools’], in M. Lee (ed.), 
Strategies of Argument: Essays in Ancient Ethics, Epistemology, and Logic (Oxford, 
2014), 21-59. I have argued in detail elsewhere that this assessment of the account of 
pleasure in Republic 9 is based on an uncharitable reading of the text that fails to 
appreciate Plato’s account, and I will not revisit the matter here. See M. M. Erginel, 
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What I wish to focus on in this paper is the extent to which Plato’s views 
concerning pleasure and pain remain consistent throughout the relevant dialogues, in 
ways that have not been adequately brought to light in the literature. It has been 
acknowledged that versions of what has been called the ‘replenishment’ or 
‘restoration’ model of pleasure can be found in the Gorgias, Republic, Timaeus, and 
Philebus. Yet the full extent of the continuity between these versions of the model has 
gone unrecognized, in particular with respect to the psychological account of pain, and 
therefore of impure pleasure – pleasure that is mixed with pain. I aim to show that 
Plato’s last extended treatment of pleasure in the Philebus preserves, in more 
sophisticated form, the core psychological account that was operational in the Gorgias, 
the Republic and the Timaeus, which arguably mark different stages in the maturation 
                                                                                                                                        
‘Plato on a Mistake about Pleasure’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 44 (2006), 
447-68; ‘Inconsistency and Ambiguity in Republic IX’ [‘Inconsistency’], The 
Classical Quarterly, 61 (2011), 493-520; and ‘Plato on the Psychology of Pleasure and 
Pain’ [‘Psychology’], Phoenix, 65 (2011), 288-314, where I offer a detailed assessment 
of the account of pleasure in Republic 9. Recent work on the account of pleasure in 
Republic 9, such as D. C. Russell, Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life (Oxford, 
2005); J. Warren, ‘Plato on the Pleasures and Pains of Knowing’ [‘Pleasures’], Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 39 (2010), 1-32; and J. Warren, ‘Socrates and the 
Patients: Republic IX, 583c-585a’ [‘Patients’], Phronesis, 56 (2011), 113-37, has been 
more charitable. 
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of the same model.2 More specifically, I shall argue that, contrary to the scholarly 
consensus, all four dialogues agree that a necessary condition for pain is a state of 
imbalance or disharmony rather than a process of destruction or deterioration. Given 
that the restoration model takes pleasure to be possible only during a process of 
restoration, it follows that the model’s account of pleasure and pain are strikingly 
asymmetrical. Crucially for Platonic moral psychology, it also follows that impure 
pleasures can be mixed with pain not only sequentially but also simultaneously. This 
consequence is of great significance for a range of views Plato defends, most 
importantly the thesis that pure pleasures are always more pleasant than impure 
pleasures. I hope to establish that the reading defended here is not only better 
supported by the textual evidence but also more charitable, attributing to Plato a more 
sophisticated and compelling set of views about pleasure, pain, and desire. 
 
1. Whence cometh pain? 
The Republic and Philebus stand out among the four works, since in these two 
dialogues Plato offers an account of pleasure and pain, as well as a discussion of the 
role of pleasure in a good life (the latter dialogue doing so in a significantly more 
                                                
2 Here I assume a conventional dating of the dialogues, listing these works in 
chronological order as: Gorgias, Republic, Timaeus, Philebus, though it would not 
pose a threat to my interpretation even if the debated position of the Timaeus were 
different.  
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detailed way).3 The Gorgias and the Timaeus, on the other hand, have a more narrowly 
circumscribed interest in pleasure and pain, Plato’s purposes being served without a 
full-fledged account.4 In both the Republic and the Philebus Plato draws a distinction 
between impure and pure (καθαραί) pleasures – pleasures that are mixed with pain and 
not mixed with pain, respectively. The distinction is important for Platonic moral 
psychology since it is important for Plato, in both works, to establish that pure 
pleasures are superior to impure pleasures qua pleasures, because they are pure. 
In the Republic, this discussion occurs in the context of Plato’s third proof of 
the central thesis that the just man is happier than the unjust: in what he regards as the 
‘greatest and most decisive’ (9, 583b6-7) argument for this thesis, Plato offers two 
distinct criteria for the evaluation of pleasure, the first on the basis of purity and the 
second on truth. According to both criteria, Plato argues, the pleasures of the 
philosopher – who has earlier in the Republic turned out to be identical to the just 
                                                
3 I follow the convention of translating lupē as ‘pain’, though ‘pain’ arguably has a 
narrower meaning in English than what the Greeks meant by lupē. Thus J. C. B. 
Gosling (trans. and comm.), Plato, Philebus [Philebus] (Oxford, 1975) prefers to 
translate the word as ‘distress’. 
4 In the Gorgias, Plato’s interest in pleasure and pain appears limited to the goal of 
refuting the hedonism of Callicles, who has a rather impoverished view of the variety 
of pleasures that may be pursued. In the Timaeus, on the other hand, the treatment of 
pleasure and pain concerns only the pleasures and pains of the body (64a). 
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person – are the most pleasant.5 The criterion of purity yields this result by showing 
that only the philosopher’s pleasures are pure, all others being impure, i.e., mixed with 
pain. For the purposes of this paper I leave aside the criterion of truth, except to note 
that it ranks pleasures with respect to their truth, or reality, on the basis of the ‘degrees 
of reality’ theory, a component of the theory of Forms put forward in the central books 
of the Republic.6  
Given the absence of the Forms in the Philebus – whether or not because they 
have been abandoned – it is unsurprising that this approach to evaluating pleasure does 
not figure in it, although the Philebus introduces other ways of speaking of the truth of 
pleasures, most interestingly by treating pleasures as propositional attitudes bearing 
truth-value.7 This has been fertile ground for scholarship, though again, I leave it aside 
                                                
5 Frede, ‘Rumpelstiltskin’, has argued that the two criteria yield inconsistent results, 
the criterion of truth is considerably more exclusive than the criterion of purity, the 
former resulting in a much smaller class of superior pleasures than the latter. I argue in 
Erginel, ‘Inconsistency’, that this criticism is unfounded.  
6 For a discussion of this theory, see G. Vlastos, ‘Degrees of Reality in Plato’, in R. 
Bambrough (ed.), New Essays in Plato and Aristotle (New York, 1965), 1-19 (repr. in 
G. Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton, 1981), 58-75); and G. Santas, ‘The Form of 
the Good in Plato’s Republic’, Philosophical Inquiry, 2 (1980), 374–403 (repr. in J. 
Anton and A. Preus (eds.), Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. ii (Albany, 1983), 
232–63). 
7 It should be noted that, as in Republic 9’s criterion of truth (my reading of which is in 
Erginel, ‘Inconsistency’), in the Philebus (51b-53c) too Plato takes the pleasantness of 
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to focus on the purity of pleasure, and the way in which it may be mixed with pain.8 
Having introduced and discussed the pleasures that are mixed with pains (45a-50d), 
Plato raises the possibility of pleasures that are not so mixed – pure pleasures – at 51b-
52d. Here he compares the two kinds of pleasure, and declares the pure pleasures to be 
superior in that only they belong to the class of things possessing measure or limit (τῶν 
ἐµµέτρων, 52d1). The crucial upshot of this is as follows: 
καὶ σύµπασα ἡδονὴ σµικρὰ µεγάλης καὶ ὀλίγη πολλῆς, καθαρὰ λύπης, ἡδίων 
καὶ ἀληθεστέρα καὶ καλλίων γίγνοιτ’ ἄν.9 (53b10-c2) 
                                                                                                                                        
a pleasure to depend on the nature of its object. In the latter case, however, there is no 
apparent reference to the theory of Forms. 
8 D. Frede (trans. and comm.), Plato, Philebus [Philebus] (Indianapolis, 1993), xlvi, 
and T. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (Oxford, 1995), 329, take impure pleasure to be a species 
of false pleasure, though this characterization has been disputed, for instance by 
Whiting (‘Fools’). Other recent discussions of the truth and falsity of pleasure in the 
Philebus include V. Harte, ‘The Philebus on Pleasure: The Good, the Bad and the 
False’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104 (2004), 111-28; and M. Evans, 
‘Plato on the Possibility of Hedonic Mistakes’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 
35 (2008), 89-124. 
9 I have used the current OCT’s of Plato’s dialogues for the Greek text (Duke et al. for 
vol. I, Slings for the Republic, and Burnet for the rest), with the exception of the 
Gorgias, for which I use E. R. Dodds, Plato, Gorgias. A Revised Text with 
Introduction and Commentary [Gorgias] (Oxford, 1959). Translations of the Philebus 
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any pleasure that is unmixed with pain, however small in size or number, 
would be pleasanter, truer, and more beautiful than impure pleasure that is 
great in size or number. 
The ranking of the goods at the end of the Philebus (66a-67b), moreover, makes room 
only for pure pleasures, excluding all others from the list.10 
In both the Republic and the Philebus, therefore, Plato makes bold claims of 
great significance for the dialogue’s primary concerns, about the superior pleasantness 
of pure pleasures compared to pleasures that are mixed with pain. It would seem rather 
important for the interpretation and assessment of these claims, then, to investigate the 
nature of pain, and the precise manner in which it comes to be mixed with some 
pleasures. Yet scholars have shown surprisingly little interest in pain in these works, 
                                                                                                                                        
are based on Frede, Philebus, with modifications. All other translations are mine unless 
otherwise noted. 
10 Plato identifies pure pleasures as having the fifth rank, mentioning a sixth position 
but leaving it unspecified what would occupy the position. It has been argued that 
Plato had in mind the impure but necessary pleasures, but refrained from identifying 
them because they are not good. See Frede, Philebus, 76 n. 2; R. Hackforth, Plato’s 
Examination of Pleasure, A Translation of the Philebus, with Introduction and 
Commentary [Examination] (Cambridge, 1945), 128; and P. M. Lang, ‘The Ranking of 
the Goods at Philebus 66a-67b’, Phronesis, 55 (2010), 153-69 at 153. See also E. A. 
Austin, ‘Fools and Malicious Pleasure in Plato’s Philebus’, History of  
Philosophy Quarterly, 29 (2012), 125-39, who argues that the impure pleasure of 
‘philosophically refuting fools and the self-blind’ in particular belongs in the best life. 
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and most of what has been written follows a line of interpretation that, I believe, 
misrepresents Plato’s thought.11 This misrepresentation, moreover, is uncharitable to 
Plato, as it saddles Plato with an implausible view of pain and renders his claims on the 
subject much less appealing. We would do well, then, to heed Plato’s own instruction 
that ‘we cannot adequately examine pleasure separately from pain’ (Phileb., 31b5-6).  
The received view of Plato’s thought on pain has been endorsed most 
prominently in Frede’s influential work on the Philebus. On her interpretation of the 
Philebus, pleasure and pain are ‘identified with’ the processes of restoration and 
destruction or disintegration, respectively, of the natural and harmonious condition of a 
living organism.12 The key passage on which this identification rests is 31a8-32b4, 
especially 32a9-b4: 
                                                
11 Even in such a comprehensive work as Gosling and Taylor, Greeks, and despite their 
extended discussion of pleasures that are mixed with pain, no account of pain itself can 
be found. M. Evans, ‘Plato and the Meaning of Pain’ [‘Pain’], Apeiron, 40 (2007), 71-
93, offers a detailed examination of pain in the Philebus, though he focuses on a 
different aspect of pain than what I discuss here. D. Wolfsdorf, Pleasure in Ancient 
Greek Philosophy [Pleasure] (Cambridge, 2013) devotes significantly more space to 
pain than is typical, though I disagree with his reading, as I explain below. 
12 Frede, Philebus, xlii-xliv. She writes that the dialogue offers a ‘general definition of 
pleasure and pain as restoration and destruction, respectively’ (xliv). Likewise, we find 
in D. Frede, Platon, Philebos, Übersetzung und Kommentar [Philebos] (Göttingen, 
1997), 229 n. 13: ‘The summary at 32b brings this uncertainty [about pleasure and 
pain] to an end. It explains the processes of destruction and restoration themselves as 
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τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἔµψυχον γεγονὸς εἶδος, ὅπερ ἔλεγον 
ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ὅταν µὲν τοῦτο φθείρηται, τὴν µὲν φθορὰν λύπην εἶναι, τὴν δ’ εἰς 
τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδόν, ταύτην δὲ αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων ἡδονήν. 
Whenever the natural combination of the unlimited and the limit that forms a live 
organism, as I explained before, is destroyed, this destruction is (a) pain, while 
the return towards its own nature, this general restoration, is (a) pleasure.13 
Frede takes this passage to mean that pleasure and pain are opposed processes, moving 
towards, and away from, the harmonious condition, respectively.14 She notes that a 
number of qualifications are introduced later in the dialogue, namely that these 
processes must be perceived for there to be pleasure and pain (a point to which I will 
return shortly) and that memory and desire play an important role in these processes. 
Pleasure and pain are therefore not identical to, and cannot be defined as, simply the 
processes of restoration and destruction. Frede leaves it unclear whether she ultimately 
endorses a qualified definition or identity statement, yet a crucial feature remains 
                                                                                                                                        
pleasure and pain’ (Die Zusammenfassung von 32b macht dieser Unsicherheit jedoch 
ein Ende. Sie erklärt die Prozesse von Auflösung und Wiederherstellung selbst zu Lust 
und Unlust.)  
13 A crucial difference from Frede’s translation here is my addition of indefinite 
articles in parentheses, which captures the possibility of reading the Greek as merely 
making a claim about one kind of pain (and pleasure). I will address the significance of 
this possibility in section 7. 
14 Plato refers to the condition in which the natural combination of the limit (πέρας) 
and the unlimited (ἄπειρον) occurs as a ‘harmony’ (ἁρµονία) at 31c11 and 31d4.  
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constant in her interpretation, concerning the necessary conditions for pleasure and 
pain: the processes of restoration and destruction are necessary conditions for pleasure 
and pain, respectively. On this symmetrical analysis of pleasure and pain, pleasure 
occurs only during the process of restoration while pain occurs only during the process 
of destruction.  
 The pleasure component of this view is undoubtedly of great interest, but it is 
the pain component that is the concern of the present paper. This view of pain may be 
called the ‘process’ view of pain, since on this view pain occurs only during a 
particular process, that of the destruction of the natural state.15 Frede’s interpretation of 
pain in the Philebus as a process has not been challenged in the recent literature as far 
as I am aware, and it has been endorsed by those who have addressed the issue. Thus 
Evans, Arenson, Fletcher, Harte, Whiting, and Price take it as evident that pain should 
be understood in accordance with the process view.16 Against this view I would like to 
                                                
15 In what follows, ‘the process view’ refers to the process view of pain, though the 
symmetrical analysis discussed above takes pleasure to be a process too, and could be 
taken to involve a process view of pleasure. This view of pain may also be 
characterized as ‘unidirectional’ (as I do in my ‘Psychology’) since on this view pain 
occurs only during one of the two opposed processes, moving in only one direction. 
On the symmetrical analysis, both pleasure and pain are unidirectional in this sense, 
each occurring only during one of the two opposed processes.  
16 Evans, ‘Pain’, considers alternative ways to formulate Plato’s theory of pain in the 
Philebus, all of which require the animal in pain to be undergoing a ‘destructive 
process’ with respect to the animal’s body or soul, however the other conditions are to 
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be specified. Thus he begins with the thesis that ‘for any animal A and any destructive 
process D, if A is undergoing D, then A is undergoing pain’, and all following 
formulations involve as a necessary condition the existence of some destructive 
process. K. E. Arenson, ‘Natural and Neutral States in Plato’s Philebus’ [‘Natural’], 
Apeiron, 44 (2011), 191-209 at 196, similarly, takes restorations and destructions or 
depletions to be ‘processes that are required in order to experience pleasure and pain’. 
In the light of the perception requirement, she argues that it is not merely restorations 
and destructions ‘that constitute pleasure and pain, respectively, but perceived changes 
– perceived restorations and destructions’ (197). E. Fletcher, ‘Plato on Pure Pleasure 
and the Best Life’, Phronesis, 59 (2014), 113-42 at 115-17, argues that at 32a-b, 
Socrates associates pleasure and pain with ‘specific changes in the condition of a living 
organism, processes of restoration in the case of pleasure, and processes of destruction 
in the case of pain’. Likewise, V. Harte, ‘Desire, Memory, and the Authority of Soul: 
Plato, Philebus 35c-d’ [‘Desire’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 46 (2014), 33-
72 at 37, claims that Socrates identifies pleasure and pain ‘as consisting in processes in 
which an animal’s natural harmonious condition undergoes destruction (pain) or 
restoration (pleasure)’. On Whiting’s (‘Fools’, 26) reading, bodily pleasures and pains 
‘involve departures from and returns to harmonious conditions that are natural to the 
organisms subject to these pleasures and pains’. A. W. Price, ‘Varieties of Pleasure in 
Plato and Aristotle’ [‘Varieties’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 52 (2017), 
177-208 at 178 also maintains that in the Philebus, ‘two opposite movements or 
processes’ give rise to pleasure and pain: ‘a restoration of the harmony’ of living 
creatures, and ‘a disruption of the harmony’, respectively. Wolfsdorf seems to belong 
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put forward what we may call the ‘state’ view of pain, according to which the 
necessary condition for pain is not a process of destruction but rather a state of 
disharmony, the absence of the natural and harmonious state. On this alternative 
interpretation, pain may occur during both of the processes of destruction and 
restoration since the state of imbalance or lack of harmony obtains in both cases. Given 
the traditional view of pleasure as occurring exclusively during processes of 
restoration, the state view of pain construes pleasure and pain asymmetrically: it pairs 
the process of restoration not with the process of destruction, but rather with a state of 
disharmony.17 I aim to show, in what follows, that the scholarly consensus around the 
                                                                                                                                        
in this camp as well, insofar as his reading takes any instance of impure pleasure, by 
itself, to be mixed with pain only sequentially and not simultaneously, simultaneous 
mixture being possible only when a destructive process is accompanied by a distinct 
source of pleasure, such as the pain of hunger and the pleasure of anticipating a meal 
coexisting (Pleasure, 55, 79, 85). (I will have more to say on the two kinds of mixture 
shortly.) It should be noted that many of the scholars who endorse the process view of 
pain do not appear to have much at stake regarding this issue. Their interpretations, I 
believe, could be brought in line with the alternative view I defend without great 
difficulty and would benefit from doing so. 
17 In line with the reasoning in n. 15 above, this view may be characterized as 
‘bidirectional’ (as in my ‘Psychology’). This characterization, however, seems to 
suggest that pain occurs only during one of the two opposed processes, and may not 
occur in a stable state of imbalance. There is some evidence in the Philebus that Plato 
took the human body to be always experiencing either deterioration or restoration with 
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process view of pain is untenable, and that it is rather the state view of pain that we 
find in the Philebus as well as in the earlier works tackling the subject, namely the 
Gorgias, the Republic, and the Timaeus.  
To clarify the contrast between the process and state views of pain, we may 
consider what they entail with respect to one of Plato’s favourite examples in this 
context, thirst. On the process view, the pain of thirst may exist only while we are 
‘emptying’, getting increasingly thirsty, given that the relevant process of destruction 
is a necessary condition for any pain. In other words, it is not possible to experience 
the pain of thirst while we are drinking and thereby restoring our body’s harmonious 
state, during which process pleasure alone may exist. The state view, on the other 
hand, allows the pain of thirst both while getting increasingly dehydrated and while we 
rehydrate. It follows from this that pain does not have to suddenly cease when we 
begin to rehydrate.  
It should be obvious that these two views about pain also yield very different 
results about the nature of mixed pleasures: on the process view, pleasure and pain 
cannot be experienced simultaneously with respect to the same condition, given that 
                                                                                                                                        
respect to each condition (e.g., always undergoing either the process of dehydrating or 
rehydrating): he points out that this follows from the doctrine of some wise men (οἱ 
σοφοί, 43a2) that everything is always in flux, presumably alluding to Heracliteanism. 
Plato shows how his account could easily accommodate the doctrine of flux, but he 
does not commit himself to the doctrine, nor does his account presuppose it. (Cf. my 
‘Psychology’, 290 n. 8.) 
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the former can only be experienced during the process of restoration, while the latter 
can only be experienced during the process of deterioration. The process view allows, 
of course, the simultaneous mixture of pleasures and pains that arise independently, 
due to the processes of restoration and destruction occurring with respect to distinct 
conditions or natural states.18 It does not allow, however, the simultaneous mixture of a 
pleasure and the corresponding pain, resulting from the processes of restoration and 
destruction with respect to the same natural state, given that one cannot undergo both 
processes with respect to the same natural state at the same time.19 Consequently, 
                                                
18 It is, of course, consistent with the process view to enjoy the pleasure of quenching 
one’s thirst while suffering from a headache.  
19 The impossibility in question would follow from the principle of opposites in Rep. 4, 
436b-e: it states that the same thing cannot do or undergo opposite things at the same 
time. Since the processes of restoration and destruction are opposite movements, they 
cannot take place in the same thing simultaneously. One might wonder whether this is 
inconsistent with the myth at Gorgias 493a-c, where we find the metaphors of sieves 
and leaky jars for the souls and soul-parts, respectively, containing insatiable desires. 
Here the same container might seem to undergo the opposite movements of filling and 
emptying simultaneously. But in fact a leaky container cannot be simultaneously 
filling and emptying: even though we may pour into the container while it leaks, the 
net outcome will be either positive (filling), negative (emptying), or neutral (remaining 
at the same level of fullness), depending on the relative magnitudes of what flows in 
and out. In the relevant texts, the restoration model associates pleasure and pain with 
the restoration and destruction of natural states, presumably as the net outcome of all 
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mixed pleasures can be mixed only in the sense of pain preceding and following the 
corresponding pleasure, that is, as sequential mixtures.20 On the state view, on the 
other hand, the pleasure and the corresponding pain can coexist during the process of 
restoration. Mixed pleasures, therefore, may consist of pleasures that are not only 
sequentially but also simultaneously mixed with the corresponding pain.21 The 
significance of this difference will become clearer below.22 
                                                                                                                                        
restorative and destructive factors, not with each of these factors 
individually. Otherwise Plato would be claiming, implausibly, that someone whose 
body temperature is rising due to fever may experience pleasure just because she took 
some inadequate medication that resulted only in a slightly lower rate at which her 
temperature is rising. 
20 When we satisfy our naturally recurring desires, such as those for food, drink, and 
sex, it seems that the sequential mixture of pleasure and pain is such that every 
pleasure is both preceded and followed by pain at some point (though perhaps not 
immediately). But this is clearly not the case with all mixed pleasures: one can have 
non-recurring and one-way sequential mixtures when, for instance, one enjoys being 
cooled after suffering from extreme heat, since one may thereafter successfully avoid 
the heat. 
21 In what follows, the ‘simultaneous’ vs. ‘sequential’ mixtures of pleasure and pain 
refer to the manner in which corresponding pairs of pleasure and pain are mixed.  
22 The claim that pain can be experienced also during the process of restoration refers, 
of course, to processes of restoration that follow painful processes of destruction. If the 
restoration model applies to pure pleasures as well, as most scholars believe, then there 
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2. Fundamentals of the restoration model 
Any attempt to understand Plato’s account of pleasure and pain in terms of restoration 
and destruction needs to address two basic issues: the extent to which this model 
occurs in Plato’s dialogues, and the further condition that the restoration or destruction 
in question be perceived.23 
(i) The restoration model in the Platonic corpus 
The account of pleasure and pain in terms of restoration and destruction, respectively, 
is found not only in the Philebus, but also in the other works mentioned above – 
Gorgias, Republic, and Timaeus – at varying degrees of sophistication. ‘The 
restoration model’, as we may call it, appears in the Timaeus in virtually identical form 
to what the Philebus offers: 
τὸ µὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γιγνόµενον ἁθρόον παρ' ἡµῖν πάθος ἀλγεινόν, τὸ δ’ 
εἰς φύσιν ἀπιὸν πάλιν ἁθρόον ἡδύ. (Timaeus 64c8-d2)  
An unnatural affection that occurs within us violently and suddenly is painful, 
while a sudden return to the natural state, is pleasant.24  
                                                                                                                                        
would be no pain during such a process of restoration. Perceived restorations that 
occur during painless lacks (‘ἐνδείας…ἀλύπους’, Phileb. 51b5-6), therefore, would not 
involve any pain, but rather pure pleasure. 
23 As I discuss in section 7 below, both ‘destruction’ and the Greek word it translates, 
phthora, can refer to either a process or a state. 
24 I use ‘affection’ for πάθος rather than ‘disturbance’ as in D. J. Zeyl (trans. and 
intro.), Plato, Timaeus [Timaeus] (Indianapolis, 2000), since both πάθος and παθήµατα 
are used neutrally in these passages, without the negative connotations of 
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Leaving aside for the moment the question whether pain should be understood in terms 
of the process or state view, it seems clear from this and surrounding passages that 
pain occurs in the absence of the natural state (ἀλλοτριούµενα µὲν λύπας, 64e6-65a1), 
while pleasure occurs during the restoration of, or the return to (καθιστάµενα δὲ εἰς τὸ 
αὐτὸ πάλιν ἡδονάς, 65a1), the natural state.25 This framework for explaining the nature 
of pleasure and pain is in complete agreement with the model we find at 31a8-32b4 
and elsewhere in the Philebus. In the Gorgias and the Republic, on the other hand, we 
find what may be considered relatively rudimentary versions of the model, in terms of 
‘filling’ (πλήρωσις) rather than restoration. In the Gorgias, the model appears briefly, 
in the context of Socrates’ argument against Callicles’ hedonism. In the course of this 
argument (to which I return below), Socrates obtains Callicles’ consent regarding two 
theses that capture the filling model: (a) the filling (πλήρωσις) of a lack, such as 
drinking when thirsty, is pleasure (496e1-4), and (b) every lack (ἔνδεια) and appetite is 
painful (496d3-4). In Republic 9, similarly, we find that (a) being filled (πληροῦσθαι) 
with what is proper to our nature is pleasant (585d11), while (b) hunger, thirst, and the 
                                                                                                                                        
‘disturbance’. Zeyl also translates ἁθρόον as ‘intense’, whereas ‘sudden’ would be a 
better translation, since it reflects the temporal sense that Plato makes clearer in a 
similar Philebus passage, which I discuss in the next subsection. 
25 The model is discussed here in terms of bodily pleasure and pain, which is the only 
kind of pleasure and pain that Plato is concerned with in those passages.  
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like are a kind of emptiness or emptying (κένωσις)26 related to the body’s state (585a8-
b1). Every pleasure, Plato argues in the Republic, results from a filling (πλήρωσις, 
585b9), which involves an empty vessel that is being filled (τὸ πληρούµενον), while 
pain results from the loss of the fullness of this vessel.27  
 While we may plausibly take Plato to operate with the same restoration model 
throughout, the Timaeus and the Philebus offer a more advanced version of that model 
than what we find in the Gorgias and the Republic. To be sure, Plato treats pleasure as 
a πλήρωσις in the Timaeus (e.g., 65a3-4) and the Philebus (e.g., 31e8, 42c9-d3) as 
well. Yet it is important that this is not the only concept at his disposal, since the 
‘filling’ model is not equally appropriate for all cases, and construing pleasure and 
pain in terms of the restoration and destruction of a natural state makes better sense of 
many cases, such as the pain caused by extreme heat and the pleasure of being cooled. 
It is evident that, in such cases, describing the pain and the pleasure in terms of a lack 
and a filling, respectively, is rather metaphorical and not sufficiently explanatory: 
                                                
26 I will address the question whether we should read kenōsis as ‘emptiness’ or 
‘emptying’ in section 5 below. At this point I describe the model neutrally between the 
process and state readings. 
27 Plato’s discussion of the truth and reality of pleasures throughout 585a-e leaves no 
doubt that the filling model is meant to explain not only bodily pleasure: all pleasure is 
to be understood as a filling process, of the body or the soul, with what is proper to our 
nature. In Erginel, ‘Inconsistency’, I address and reject Gosling and Taylor’s view that 
the Republic contains a ‘fatal ambiguity’ about whether pleasure is a process or a state 
(Greeks, 122-6). Cf. Warren, ‘Patients’, 123 n. 15. 
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being too hot is not helpfully described as a lack, and likewise for describing cooling 
down as a filling. It should be clear that what has been said here is compatible with 
both the process and state views of pain. 
We may see in the above passages the basis for the standard view that 
‘although Plato’s theory of pleasure clearly evolved over time, his overall 
understanding of pleasure as replenishment remained unchanged’.28 Thus the standard 
view has been that the restoration model is meant to account for all pleasure, in all the 
works where it occurs. Yet a number of scholars have denied that Plato takes a single 
model to be applicable to all kinds of pleasure.29 In this paper, however, I refrain from 
                                                
28 G. Van Riel, Pleasure and the Good Life: Plato, Aristotle and the Neoplatonists 
[Good Life] (Leiden, 2000), 7. Likewise, A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato’s 
Timaeus [Timaeus] (Oxford, 1928), 448, comments regarding the Timaeus passages on 
pleasure that ‘the drift of the whole theory is exactly that of the discussions of pleasure 
in the Philebus and Republic ix’. 
29 See, especially, A. E. Taylor (trans. and intro.), Plato: Philebus and Epinomis 
[Philebus] (London, 1956), 56-7; Gosling and Taylor, Greeks; G. R. Carone, 
‘Hedonism and the Pleasureless Life in Plato’s Philebus’ [‘Hedonism’], Phronesis, 45 
(2000), 257-83; G. R. Carone, Plato’s Cosmology and its Ethical Dimensions 
(Cambridge, 2005) at 104-9; E. Fletcher, ‘The Divine Method and the Disunity of 
Pleasure in the Philebus’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 55 (2017), 179-208; 
and Price, ‘Varieties’. For a response to Gosling and Taylor’s view regarding the 
Philebus, see, for instance, T. M. Tuozzo, ‘The General Account of Pleasure in Plato’s 
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tackling this thorny issue, since I am interested in the psychology of pleasure and pain 
as understood in Plato’s restoration model: if indeed he believes that some pleasures 
fall outside the scope of the restoration model, these also fall outside the scope of the 
present paper.  
I am, moreover, concerned primarily with the restoration model’s construal of 
pain and pleasure that is mixed with pain, whereas the purported cases of non-
restorative pleasure are typically pure pleasures. Critics of the standard view also point 
out, however, that Plato does not, in the Philebus, apply the restoration model to non-
bodily pleasures and pains, adding that it does not seem ‘appropriate’ to do so.30 While 
it is true that Plato’s treatment of the impure pleasures and pains belonging to the soul 
at 47d-50d does not explicitly apply the restoration model, it is far from obvious that 
we are not expected to extend the model to cover the psychic cases. Explaining such 
cases as the pain of malice and the pleasure of malicious laughter in terms of the 
destruction and restoration of a natural psychic state would not be a stretch for Plato, 
given that he would classify a malicious, i.e., non-virtuous, person as being in a sub-
optimal psychic state. In fact, the text of the Philebus strongly favours extending the 
restoration model to psychic pains and impure pleasures, given: (a) the seamless 
transition at 47d5 from the treatment of impure bodily pleasures as restorative to the 
impure pleasures of the soul, without any indication of leaving behind the restoration 
model; (b) the explicit reference at 47d8-9 to the earlier remark about the existence of 
                                                                                                                                        
Philebus’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 34 (1996), 495-513; and Evans, 
‘Pain’, 83-4. 
30 Gosling and Taylor, Greeks, 136.  
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completely psychic impure pleasures, which occurs in a context where the restoration 
model was clearly being employed (46b8-c1); (c) the treatment of all impure pleasures 
– including the psychic ones – as a family or tribe (συγγενεῖς, 46b5), to be offered a 
common explanation; (d) the complete absence of an alternative account or model for 
impure psychic pleasures. Whether or not some, or all, pure pleasures are non-
restorative, therefore, it seems fair to conclude that the nature of the competition – 
impure pleasure, both bodily and psychic – depends on how pain is understood by the 
restoration model.31  
(ii) The perception condition 
What I have said so far does not represent a complete description of pain according to 
the process and state views, for the same reason that pleasure is not simply the process 
of restoring the harmonious condition. This is because Plato imposes a further 
condition on both pleasure and pain, that the phenomenon in question be perceived by 
the soul. It is a well-known feature of the Philebus that Plato introduces the perception 
condition at 43b-d, where we are told that it is not any ‘downward and upward’ – 
                                                
31 Given Plato’s silence on the matter, it is difficult to imagine what kind of restoration 
might be at play in some impure psychic pleasures. Price, ‘Varieties’, 178-83, 
highlights this difficulty particularly in the case of anticipatory pleasures, concluding 
that ‘pleasures of replenishment’ are not the only variety in the Philebus. While I agree 
that the Philebus leaves it unclear how the restoration model might be applied to 
certain pleasures, I believe the above considerations suggest that Plato meant the 
model to be applied beyond the bodily pleasures through which the model was 
introduced.  
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destructive and restorative – change that causes pain and pleasure, respectively, but 
rather such changes that are also sufficiently large or strong (µεγάλαι).32 The reason for 
this is that, of the many changes they undergo, living organisms perceive (αἰσθάνεται) 
only those that are sufficiently large or strong, while the moderate and small or weak 
ones (µέτριαί τε καὶ σµικραί) escape our notice. Plato’s example of an unperceived 
change sheds light on his taxonomy: we do not perceive growing (αὐξανόµενοι, 43b2), 
presumably because it happens too gradually, indicating that the magnitude in question 
concerns both the size of the change and the time it takes. It follows that even if 
everything is always in flux – as the wise men mentioned at 43a claim – we will 
experience neither pleasure nor pain (thus being in a neutral state) when the change 
occurring is too small and/or too slow to be perceived.33 
It is worth noting that the perception condition for pleasure and pain was also 
in place in the Timaeus. When Plato sets out to explain the causes of bodily pleasure 
and pain, he explains how perception of changes in the appropriate body parts take 
place, as follows: 
                                                
32 This builds on Plato’s treatment of how the soul perceives some affections 
(παθήµατα) of the body as they ‘pass through both body and soul’ while others are 
‘extinguished within the body before reaching the soul, leaving it unaffected’ (33d2-6).  
33 For a helpful discussion of the perception condition, see Evans, ‘Pain’. The 
perception condition introduces the possibility of a contrast between the natural state, 
which may be ‘inaccessible’ (Van Riel, Good Life, 26) or ‘unachievable’ (Arenson, 
‘Natural’, 192) for human beings, and the neutral state, which occurs whenever the 
soul does not perceive any change.  
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τὸ µὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν εὐκίνητον, ὅταν καὶ βραχὺ πάθος εἰς αὐτὸ ἐµπίπτῃ, 
διαδίδωσιν κύκλῳ µόρια ἕτερα ἑτέροις ταὐτὸν ἀπεργαζόµενα, µέχριπερ ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ 
φρόνιµον ἐλθόντα ἐξαγγείλῃ τοῦ ποιήσαντος τὴν δύναµιν. (64b3-6) 
When what is easily moved by nature is contacted by even a small affection, the 
affection is passed on in a chain reaction, one part affecting another in the same 
way as it was affected, until it reaches the center of consciousness and proclaims 
the property that produced the reaction.  
In line with the Philebus account, moreover, we are told that changes that are intense 
and sudden are perceived whereas those that are ‘mild and gradual’ (ἡρέµα καὶ κατὰ 
σµικρόν) are not (64d3–4). Less widely recognized, however, is that an embryonic 
version of the perception condition can be found in Republic 9. In the context of 
explaining the difference between pleasure and the cessation of pain, Plato argues that 
both pleasure and pain are, as they arise in the soul, a kind of motion, whereas the 
intermediate state between them is a calm state (ἡσυχία) where no such motion exists 
(583e9-584a2). Even a bodily pleasure or pain, Plato suggests, involves a psychic 
motion, which we may reasonably understand as referring to perception, though the 
dense account in Book 9 has no room for the details.34  
 At this point we may state the difference between the process and state views 
with greater clarity, as alternative views of the conditions under which pain can occur. 
                                                
34 C. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics (Oxford, 2002), 
351-4, seems to overlook this in arguing that the account of pleasure in Republic 9 is 
unsophisticated and that the perception condition does not come into play until the 
Timaeus and the Philebus. 
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Given the common understanding that pleasure occurs only when the process of 
restoration is perceived, the former view takes pain to occur, symmetrically, only when 
the process of deterioration is perceived. The latter view, by contrast, takes pain to 
occur only when the absence of the natural state is perceived, whether the process of 
destruction or restoration is taking place.35 On the state view, therefore, impure 
pleasures can consist of a simultaneous mixture of pleasure and pain because pleasure 
results from the perceived restoration while pain results, at the same time, from the 
perceived distance from the natural state.36 It is worth emphasizing that the alternative 
views are not construed as definitions of pain, since a variety of definitions are 
possible under each view.37 I leave aside, for the present purposes, what Plato takes the 
                                                
35 Presumably pain involves a perception not merely of one’s not being in the natural 
state, but also of how far one has deviated from it, the distance between one’s 
condition and the natural state determining the magnitude of the pain. Plato does not, 
however, supply such details, which his charitable readers must do instead. 
36 It follows from the state view that simultaneous mixtures of pleasure and pain are 
possible, but the stronger thesis that all mixed pleasures are necessarily simultaneous 
mixtures does not follow. There are, however, reasons for thinking that Plato actually 
endorses the stronger thesis in the Gorgias and the Republic, which I address in 
sections 4 and 5.  
37 See, for instance, Evans, ‘Pain’, for a discussion of alternative ways in which Plato 
may be taken to define pain. Evans casts all of the alternative formulations (including 
the one he endorses) in terms of the process view, taking pain to occur only during the 
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definition of pain to be, focusing rather on a particular necessary condition of pain and 
whether it should be understood in terms of a process or a state. 
 
3. General considerations in favour of the state view 
In this section I put forward, before addressing the textual evidence in each of the four 
dialogues separately, two general considerations in favour of interpreting Plato as 
endorsing the state view of pain.  
(i) The principle of charity 
The first general consideration that I would like to raise in favor of attributing to Plato 
the state view of pain derives from the principle of charity: other things being equal, 
we ought to prefer interpreting Plato as holding this view, since it is by far the more 
plausible view of pain. The notion that we experience pain only during the process of 
deterioration strikes me as implausible, since it seems implausible that pain disappears 
completely as soon as restoration begins. According to the process view of pain, my 
pain of hunger – which would actually be the pain of getting increasingly hungry – 
ceases completely as soon as the process of filling my stomach begins, even if I had 
been starving to death. To be more specific, on this view the pain ceases as soon as the 
perceived process of getting emptier comes to an end, whether or not I have started to 
perceive a process of filling or restoration. Consider, moreover, cases of severe pain, 
such as being stretched on a rack or exposed to extreme heat. The process view would 
have us believe that the pain in such cases ends as soon as the person is no longer 
                                                                                                                                        
process of destruction (although I take the essence of his interpretation to be 
compatible with the state view).  
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deteriorating perceptibly, for instance because the tension of the rack is being 
gradually reduced, or the temperature is dropping slowly. There would also be no pain 
at all if the person could be kept at the same level of destruction or even further 
deteriorating but with too little variation in the level of destruction to be perceived.38 
Plato’s model, moreover, applies to all kinds of pain, including pains involved in 
bodily injury, which can only be painful while the injury (i.e., the destruction process) 
is taking place according to the process view. In a case of spraining one’s ankle, for 
instance, this view takes pain to exist only during the brief moment when the spraining 
occurs, while the lengthy healing process, which begins immediately afterwards, is 
supposed to be painless. As anyone who has torn a ligament knows, however, there is 
much pain on the path to recovery.  
 It may be pointed out, on the other hand, that the process view does more 
justice to many ordinary pleasures of satisfying a desire, which may appear extremely, 
or even purely, pleasant. Having a wholesome meal when moderately hungry and at 
the speed one wishes, for instance, one may think that the pleasure far outweighs the 
pain, or that the experience contains no pain at all. On such matters we may encounter 
a clash of intuitions, and I do not intend to adjudicate between them here. It should be 
pointed out, however, that there is a concrete difference between the arguably 
counterintuitive entailments of the state and process views: Plato is well aware of the 
lure of impure pleasures, and makes significant effort to explain why people may 
mistakenly believe that impure pleasures are extremely pleasant or even purely 
pleasant (e.g., at Rep. 9, 583d-584d and Phileb. 45b-c). By contrast, he has no interest 
                                                
38 See also Erginel, ‘Psychology’, 297. 
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in defending the claim that pain disappears completely whenever restoration begins. 
Supposing that we face a psychologically counterintuitive result on either view, we 
ought to attribute to Plato the one that he is prepared to defend – whether successfully 
or not – rather than treating him as unaware of, and unprepared to defend his position 
against, the counter-intuitive consequences of the view.  
 In evaluating the plausibility or otherwise of Plato’s position, we should also 
keep in mind the distinction between a variety of pleasures and pains that may co-
occur during what appears to be a single experience, such as drinking or getting thirsty: 
When Plato discusses thirst and the concomitant pain, he has in mind solely the 
perceived dehydration of one’s body (31e10-32a1). Parallel to this pain, we may 
experience a pain associated with the fear that we may die of dehydration, which 
would disappear altogether as soon as we have found a source that supplies water 
(even if the source provides water slowly and it will take time to quench our thirst). 
There may be, therefore, some pain related to dehydration and rehydration that ceases 
completely as soon as the restoration process begins. But to claim, as the process view 
must, that the pain of thirst or dehydration too ceases at this point is an altogether 
different matter.39  
                                                
39 In the Philebus, Plato leaves no room for doubt about the distinctions between (a) a 
basic pleasure or pain, such as eating (or hunger); (b) an anticipatory pleasure or pain 
related to (a), such as the pain of anticipating severe hunger (32b-c); and (c) a pleasure 
or pain resulting from reflecting on our condition, such as the pain arising from 
thinking about how ignorant we are (52b-c). (Cf. J. Warren, The Pleasures of Reason 
in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists (Cambridge, 2014), 24-5.) 
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(ii) The ancient medical tradition 
The second point I would like to raise is interpretive in a broad sense: it concerns not 
the ideas found in Plato’s texts as such – to which I turn in the following sections – but 
the genealogy of those ideas. The restoration model that, as we have seen, Plato 
employs consistently across the relevant works appears to be based on widely held 
views in the ancient medical tradition, with which he would have been familiar. Taylor 
represents the commonly held view in arguing that the restoration model has its roots 
in Alcmaeon’s doctrine that health consists in the balance of bodily opposites.40 In a 
similar vein, Cornford contends that the account in the Timaeus of bodily health and 
disease largely follows the medical views of the time: ‘the fundamental notion of 
nearly all Greek medicine was that health depends on a due balance of proportioned 
mixture of the ultimate constituents of the body. Where the schools differed was on the 
question, what these ultimate constituents are’ (1935, 332). 
That Plato’s restoration model is rooted in the ancient medical tradition appears 
plain enough, but it has not been recognized that this connection provides further 
                                                
40 Taylor, Timaeus, 448, 587-9; and Taylor, Philebus, 56. Hackforth, Examination, 58, 
cites Taylor in agreement. Wolfsdorf (Pleasure, 35-7) too argues that the restoration 
model is based on the ancient medical tradition. For a discussion of the influence on 
Plato of various ancient medical authors, see F. M. Cornford (trans. and comm.), 
Plato’s Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato [Cosmology] (London, 1935; repr. 
Indianapolis, 1997), 332-43. For a recent treatment of Plato’s complicated relationship 
with the ancient medical tradition, see also S. B. Levin, Plato’s Rivalry with Medicine: 
A Struggle and Its Dissolution (Oxford, 2014).  
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reason to reject the process view of pain. Crucially for our purposes, disease and the 
attendant pains were understood in this tradition as resulting from a lack of balance 
and not some process of destruction of the balanced state. The author of Diseases IV, 
for instance, offers a version of the restoration model and explains the pain caused by 
an imbalance (excess) of phlegm:  
εἰ δὲ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ µείνειε, πολλὸν ἂν πόνον παράσχοι τῇ κεφαλῇ, ἐν τῇσι 
φλεψὶν ἐόν· εἰ δὲ ὀλίγον, οὐκ ἂν ποιήσειε τοῦτο.41 (35.20-22) 
If [much of it] were to remain in the head, it would cause the head much pain, 
being in the veins; while it would not do this if the quantity were small.42 
Philistion of Locri, on the other hand, maintains that we consist of the four elements – 
fire, air, water, and earth – each of which has its own power – the hot, cold, moist, and 
dry, respectively. Diseases, accordingly, result from an imbalance of these powers, 
such as an excess of heat, and not from the process of becoming too hot.43 While this 
thesis is about diseases, which lead to pains, the hot and the cold are taken up explicitly 
in relation to pain in the Hippocratic Ancient Medicine:  
                                                
41 É. Littré (ed.), Oeuvres Complètes d’Hippocrate, vol. 7: De semine, de natura pueri, 
de morbis iv (Paris, 1851). 
42 Translation by I. M. Lonie, The Hippocratic Treatises ‘On Generation’, ‘On the 
Nature of the Child’, ‘Diseases IV’, A Commentary (Berlin, 1981). The surrounding 
passages offer further examples of pain caused by imbalance. 
43 M. Wellmann, Fragmentsammlung der Griechischen Ärzte, Band I: Sikelischen 
Ärzte, Akron, Philistion und des Diokles Von Karystos (Berlin, 1901), 110-11. (See 
also Cornford, Cosmology, 333). 
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ὃν µὲν ἂν δήπου χρόνον µεµιγµένα αὐτὰ ἑωυτοῖς ἅµα τὸ θερµόν τε καὶ ψυχρὸν 
ἐνῇ, οὐ λυπεῖ. κρῆσις γὰρ καὶ µετριότης τῷ µὲν θερµῷ γίνεται ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ, 
τῷ δὲ ψυχρῷ ἀπὸ τοῦ θερµοῦ. ὅταν δ᾽ ἀποκριθῇ χωρὶς ἑκάτερον, τότε λυπεῖ. 
(16.3–7) 
So long as the hot and cold in the body are mixed up together, they cause 
no pain. For the hot is tempered and moderated by the cold, and the cold by the 
hot. But when either is entirely separated from the other, then it causes pain.44  
Here we find that pain is absent when the hot and the cold are mixed, but present when 
they are separated. Pain does not, then, occur only during a process of destruction – 
getting too hot or too cold – but rather during the state of imbalance, whether one is 
moving away from balance or returning to it. It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that 
the precursor of Plato’s restoration model in the medical tradition construes pain as 
occurring in a state of imbalance, during the processes of restoration and destruction 
alike, as the state view maintains. 
 
4. Gorgias 
In the Gorgias Socrates presents a complex and remarkable argument against 
Calliclean hedonism at 496b-497a, which turns out to contain the core of what I have 
called the state view of pain. The argument proceeds as follows, the translation 
reconstructed from the original format of questions and answers, by Socrates and 
Callicles, respectively:  
                                                
44 The text and translation are from W. H. S. Jones, Hippocrates, Volume I 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1923). 
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1. Doing well and doing badly are opposites (τοὐναντίον, 495e2-4). 
2. Opposites do not exist in the same thing at the same time, nor does the same 
thing lose opposites at the same time (495e6-9).45 
3. Hunger and thirst are, themselves, painful (πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν … καὶ τὸ 
διψῆν, 496d1-2). 
4. Every lack and desire, therefore, is painful (ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυµίαν 
ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι, 496d3-4).46 
5. The filling of a lack (πλήρωσίς τῆς ἐνδείας), such as drinking when thirsty, is 
pleasure (496e1-4).47  
                                                
45 In these lines, Plato extrapolates from the case of health and disease to the key pair 
of opposites under discussion – doing well and doing badly – apparently on the 
grounds that all pairs of opposites are alike in this respect. Just as one cannot be 
healthy and sick at the same time (οὐ γὰρ ἅµα δήπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ), Socrates 
argues, nor lose health and sickness at the same time (οὐδὲ ἅµα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγιείας 
τε καὶ νόσου), so the same holds in the case of the other pair (ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν 
ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγιείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου), since they too are opposites (εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶν 
ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις). 
46 The text does not contain a term corresponding to ‘therefore’. What corresponds to 
it, rather, is Callicles’ affirmative answer to Socrates’ question whether he needs to 
keep asking questions, or whether Callicles is willing to agree to the general statement. 
The cases of hunger and thirst are treated, apparently, as sufficient evidence for the 
general statement.  
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6. During the filling of a lack we experience a pleasure and a pain, in the same 
place and at the same time (λυπούµενον χαίρειν … ἅµα, 496e4-6). 
7. But it is impossible to do well and do badly at the same time (496e9-497a1). 
8. Therefore, pleasure and pain are not the same things as doing well and doing 
badly (497a3-5). 
This is then supplemented with the following: 
9. Moreover, desires and the pain they involve cease at the same time as (ἅµα 
παύεται) the pleasure of satisfying the appetite (497c6-d1). 
10. But it is impossible for goods and evils to cease together (497d1-3). 
11. Therefore, once again, pleasures and pains are not the same things as goods and 
evils (497d4-5). 
We encounter here, among other things, a clear and explicit rejection of the process 
view of pain, and an endorsement of the state view (at least insofar as the pains 
involved in the desires in question are concerned).48 Socrates’ anti-hedonist argument 
                                                                                                                                        
47 The qualification ‘when thirsty’ to Socrates’ question at 496e1-2 is necessary since 
not all drinking is pleasure, and is implied by τούτου οὗ λέγεις at 496d7, referring to 
‘drinking when thirsty’ (διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν) at 496d5-6. Cf. Dodds, Gorgias, 311.  
48 This passage in fact endorses, for the range of pleasures it covers, the stronger thesis 
that the pleasure involved in satisfying a desire is always mixed with pain 
simultaneously, given the unqualified claims that all lacks and desires are painful and 
that in satisfying them the pleasure and pain cease together. This does not seem to 
allow the possibility of a mixed pleasure being mixed only sequentially, even though 
the weaker thesis would suffice as far as the case against hedonism is concerned. 
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turns on the understanding that pleasure and the related pain coexist and cease at the 
same time, the pain of hunger and the pleasure of eating coexisting, for instance, and 
ceasing together when fullness is achieved. This, according to the argument, is 
precisely why hedonism is wrong, since doing well and doing badly, being opposites, 
cannot coexist in the same thing at the same time, nor can they be acquired or lost by 
the same thing at the same time.49  
It can be seen that the model put forward in the course of this argument 
contains two fundamental theses about desire that jointly entail the falsity of the 
process view of pain and confirm the state view:  
The pain thesis: All desires (such as hunger and thirst) are painful.50  
The lack thesis: All desires are lacks. 
                                                                                                                                        
Despite being unnecessary, the stronger thesis seems unavoidable given the absence of 
the perception condition in the Gorgias (which I discuss in n. 51 below): without this 
condition there is no room for claiming that a lack may not be painful even though 
filling it is pleasant (given the state view of pain).  
49 Van Riel (Good Life, 11) seems to think that Callicles agrees with Socrates that 
pleasure and pain occur together ‘though not at the same time and in the same respect’. 
But coexisting at the same time and in the same respect is precisely what the argument 
requires and is explicitly agreed upon at 496e4-6. Socrates’ argument would be 
ineffective against hedonism if it turned on the coexistence of, for instance, the 
pleasure of eating and the pain of a headache.  
50 The claim here is that all desires involve pain, not the clearly mistaken one that they 
simply are (or are kinds of) pain. 
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It follows from these two theses that desires persist as long as there is some lack, even 
if some filling has begun, and that since all desires are painful, pain too persists during 
the filling process, thus contradicting the process view. The first thesis is stated 
explicitly at (4), as following from the agreement at (3) that hunger and thirst are 
painful. It is less obvious from those lines (496d1-4), however, that the second thesis is 
being affirmed, since Socrates could conceivably have meant that all lacks and all 
desires are painful, without implying that all desires are lacks. But this would be very 
odd, given that he presents the joint general statement (that every lack and desire is 
painful) as following from the painfulness of hunger and thirst, which are desires that 
are obviously lacks. Insofar as we can generalize from the cases of hunger and thirst, 
Socrates seems to suggest, desires are lacks, affirming the lack thesis. The outstanding 
feature of this argument for our purposes is that the state view of pain entailed by the 
two theses is stated explicitly in the following lines, at (5)-(6), where Socrates argues 
that thirst, and the concomitant pain, continue while we take pleasure in drinking, 
which constitutes a filling of the lack in question. At (9), moreover, Socrates reaffirms 
that when the pleasure of satisfying an appetite ceases, so does the appetite itself, along 
with the pain that it involves.51  
                                                
51 The perception requirement for pleasure and pain seems neither explicit nor implied 
in the Gorgias, and we may wonder whether introducing it to the argument would alter 
the conclusion of this argument. We might consider the possibility, for instance, that 
one may experience a pause in the restoration process at such a point that the lack is 
unperceived and thus painless but one feels pleased. It might seem, in such a case, that 
pleasure and pain do come apart, contrary to the argument’s claim. But Plato would 
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An interpretive difficulty regarding this passage is that Plato does not specify 
the scope of the desires (ἐπιθυµίαι) in question. It is possible, in principle, that the 
                                                                                                                                        
dismiss such a case as illusory, since a pleasure must be a (perceived) filling and even 
if a phase in which we are neither filling nor emptying is physiologically possible (cf. 
n. 17), it would not really contain any pleasure. This would amount to thinking that the 
cessation of pain is pleasure, a mistake Plato identifies at Rep. 9, 584a9: ‘there is 
nothing sound in these illusions regarding the truth about pleasure’ (οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς 
τούτων τῶν φαντασµάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν). What, then, of a phase during an 
ongoing restoration process where the filling is perceived but the disharmony is 
somehow not, such that a bodily restoration involves only pleasure? I find it doubtful 
that Plato would concede this possibility since it would threaten his claim about the 
superior pleasantness of pure pleasures to those mixed with pain. (I return to this claim 
in the next section.) Regardless, however, it would pose no threat to the argument: all 
that this argument needs is to demonstrate that there is at least one pair of pleasure and 
pain such that they coexist and cease together, which would be impossible if hedonism 
were true. The possibility of cases where pleasure and pain do not coexist or cease 
together does not, therefore, constitute a threat to the argument. One may, of course, be 
unhappy with the restoration model in general, and insist that pleasure may occur 
where there is no restoration whatsoever. Yet this line of questioning falls outside the 
scope of this paper, which concerns how we ought to understand the model in the first 
place.  
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analysis offered here is meant to apply to all desire, and not any particular subset.52 
Such a thesis would be bold but also rather unappealing, due to both its implausibility 
as a psychological thesis and its inconsistency with what Plato says elsewhere. It 
would be implausible, I believe, to claim that all desires are painful lacks, since at least 
some intellectual desires appear to be painless. The decisive point, however, is that in 
Republic 9, there clearly are pure pleasures resulting from the satisfaction of painless 
desires (filling painless lacks), namely the desires of the rational part of the soul.53 As 
scholars have noted, the Gorgias does not provide sufficient evidence to determine the 
precise scope of the desires intended in this argument.54 But it is important to 
recognize that this vagueness does not pose a threat to Socrates’ argument, since even 
a small subset of painful desire – the satisfaction of which involves the coexistence of 
pleasure and pain – would suffice to refute the hedonistic thesis at issue. Given the 
dialectical role of the argument, and that no claim is made to offer a general account of 
pleasure and pain (or desire), the argument succeeds as long as it appeals to the 
pleasures (and pains) that Callicles is familiar with, and obtains his consent that 
pleasure and pain coexist, and cease together. More importantly for our purposes, the 
                                                
52 After all, Plato uses the term epithumia to refer to all desire in Rep. 9 (580d) which 
means, given the tripartition of the soul, the desires of all three parts – appetitive, 
spirited, and rational.  
53 As I argue in Erginel, ‘Inconsistency’, this is a key component of Plato’s argument 
that the philosopher’s life is the most pleasant. 
54 See, for instance, T. Irwin (trans.), Plato, Gorgias (Oxford, 1979), 202, and Gosling 
and Taylor, Greeks, 72-3. 
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process view of pain is rejected regardless of the scope of the desires in question, since 
this view categorically rules out the possibility of pain occurring during the restoration 
process. The state view, on the other hand, is confirmed here even if the analysis is 
meant to apply only to a subset of desire: this view maintains that pain may occur 
during the restoration process, not that it always does.55 It seems evident, therefore, 
that the state view of pain is employed within the Gorgias. What remains to be seen is 
whether in later dialogues, Plato continues to operate with this understanding of pain, 
or abandons it in favour of the process view, as scholars tend to suppose. 
5. Republic 
Plato’s discussion of pleasure and pain in the Republic is markedly different from what 
we found in the Gorgias: by contrast with the limited goal and unclear scope of the 
analysis in the earlier dialogue, here Plato offers a general account in the course of 
developing the third and most decisive proof of the central thesis that the just man is 
happier than the unjust. Yet the Republic passage contains several indications that 
Plato means to remind the reader of the Gorgias. One of these indications is the remark 
at 9, 586b3-4 that those who pursue the inferior kinds of pleasure – such as the 
appetitive pleasures of eating, drinking and sex – are trying in vain to fill a leaking 
vessel. This strongly echoes the metaphor employed at Gorgias 493b-c, where 
Socrates argues that the part of the soul where the insatiable appetites (ἐπιθυµίαι) of 
fools are located is like a leaking jar, such that the quest to fill it is hopeless. Second, 
as noted earlier, the simplistic version of the restoration model in terms of filling 
                                                
55 As we have seen, the state view of pain is consistent with the existence of pure 
pleasures, which involve painless restorations. 
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(πλήρωσις) a lack, which features prominently in the Republic (585a-e), makes an 
earlier appearance in the Gorgias passage that we have examined.  
The most complicated reference to the Gorgias, however, is also the earliest 
one: at the beginning of the third proof, Socrates claims that pleasure and pain are 
opposites (583c3-8), when the argument against Calliclean hedonism turned precisely 
on pleasure and pain not being opposites. This could be taken to mark a shift in Plato’s 
position (or reveal an inconsistency), but it seems, rather, to make a more nuanced 
point: prior to this remark Plato mentions (583b4), and in what follows introduces 
(584a12-c1), a class of pleasures that he had not addressed in the Gorgias, the pure 
pleasures that belong to the rational part of the soul. These pleasures, unlike those 
discussed in the Gorgias passage, do not coexist with pains, nor do they cease together 
with pains. The reasons, therefore, why the pleasures addressed in that argument – 
those of eating and drinking – could not be opposites of pains, do not apply in the case 
of pure pleasures. The pleasures that are mixed with pain, which had failed to be 
opposites with pain in the Gorgias argument, are in Republic 9 claimed to be impure 
and inferior pleasures (586a) that are, given the criterion of truth, also less trustworthy 
and less true (ἀπιστοτέρας ἂν ἡδονῆς καὶ ἧττον ἀληθοῦς, 585e4). Rather than 
indicating a retraction of his earlier view, then, Plato’s claim that pleasure and pain are 
opposites signals the introduction of pure pleasures, and is perfectly consistent with the 
treatment of impure pleasures in the Gorgias.56  
                                                
56 Dodds, Gorgias, 310, achieves consistency between the Gorgias and Republic 9 by 
arguing rather that Plato did not deny that pleasure and pain are opposites in the 
Gorgias. While this denial is not explicitly stated in the text, Socrates’ argument makes 
 40 
 It is worthwhile, I believe, to note the references to the Gorgias and trace the 
lines of continuity between the two works, not only for its own sake but also because it 
helps us recognize also the continuity with respect to the state view of pain. While the 
treatment of pleasure and pain in Republic 9 is denser, the text provides us with 
sufficient evidence that Plato maintains the same view of pain here.57 I take the most 
salient pieces of evidence for this interpretation to be the following: 
5.1 A mistake about pleasure 
Having identified pleasure and pain as opposites, Plato notes that there is, midway 
between them, a neutral or calm state (ἡσυχία, 583c7-8). On the basis of this 
distinction between three hedonic values – positive, negative, and neutral – Plato 
proceeds to explain two kinds of mistake people commonly make about pleasure: (a) 
thinking that the cessation of pain (παῦλαν λύπης) is pleasure (584b1-3); (b) thinking 
that liberation from pain (λύπης ἀπαλλαγήν), i.e., impure pleasure, is pure pleasure 
                                                                                                                                        
sense only if we take it to be implied, charity therefore requiring us to reject Dodds’ 
solution.  
57 The literature on Rep. 9 contains extremely little discussion of pain. Among scholars 
who do address the matter, Warren (‘Pleasures’, 13) supports the state view while C. 
D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato’s Republic [Philosopher-
Kings] (Princeton, 1988), 307, seems inclined to agree but does not clearly commit to 
this reading. Taylor, Timaeus, 451, and Wolfsdorf, Pleasure, 48, on the other hand, 




(584b9-c2). Leaving the second mistake aside for now, a consideration of the first 
mistake reveals a grave difficulty for the process view. Plato explains that people make 
this mistake because we evaluate our experiences by comparison with our experiences 
immediately preceding the current one: he points out at 584a7-9 that the neutral state 
appears pleasant when it is next to a painful experience (παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεινόν) while the 
same neutral state appears painful when it is next to a pleasant experience. But this 
explanation makes sense only if we assume the state view of pain, for only on this 
view does arriving at the neutral state constitute a cessation of pain, for instance the 
pain of hunger ceasing when we reach fullness, which yields a neutral state on Plato’s 
model. On the process view, by contrast, the process of filling or restoration does not 
contain pain, so reaching the neutral state resulting from fullness would constitute not 
the cessation of pain but rather the cessation of pleasure. The neutral state, therefore, 
cannot on this view follow a painful experience, at least in the ordinary cases of bodily 
filling that Plato’s discussion draws on.  
A defender of the view could point out that a painful experience could be 
followed by the neutral state if a process of destruction is reversed but the restoration is 
so gradual as to be imperceptible. But this cannot be what Plato has in mind when he 
writes about mistaking the cessation of pain for pleasure. First, the perception 
condition is implied by the claim at 583e9-10 that all pleasure and pain is a movement 
(κίνησίς τις) in the soul, but nothing is said, here or elsewhere in the Republic, of the 
conditions under which perception may or may not occur. More importantly, the 
example that Plato does provide is clearly not of this kind and is inconsistent with the 
process view: a common example of people mistaking the cessation of pain for 
pleasure, Plato argues, is that of people who are ill claiming that nothing is more 
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pleasant than being healthy (583c10-d4). The painful experience preceding the neutral 
state evidently corresponds here not only to the process of destruction but also to that 
of restoration, encompassing the entire episode of illness, lasting until the harmonious 
and healthy state is restored.58 Plato’s explicit example, then, confirms the 
understanding that mistaking the cessation of pain to be pleasure occurs when the 
neutral state follows a process of restoration during which the pain continues – an 
experience that is possible only on the state view of pain.  
5.2 The deficiency of non-philosophers’ hedonic experience 
To shed light on both of the mistakes noted above, Plato offers a spatial metaphor of 
being located in a lower region, an upper region, or the middle between them: 
οἴει οὖν ἄν τινα ἐκ τοῦ κάτω φερόµενον πρὸς µέσον ἄλλο τι οἴεσθαι ἢ ἄνω 
φέρεσθαι; καὶ ἐν µέσῳ στάντα, ἀφορῶντα ὅθεν ἐνήνεκται, ἄλλοθί που ἂν 
ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄνω, µὴ ἑωρακότα τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω; (584d6-9) 
Do you think that someone being carried from the lower region towards the 
middle would suppose anything other than that he was being carried up? And 
standing in the middle and looking at the place from which he was carried, 
would he think he was anywhere other than the upper region, as he hasn’t seen 
what is truly up?  
                                                
58 The lines immediately following (583d6–9) indicate that people who are in pain 
quite generally (καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις γε) praise the absence of pain, not only in cases of 
illness. An instance of being in pain, then, is being ill, which continues during the 
processes of both deterioration and restoration.  
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Reaching the mid-point after climbing out of the lower region and thinking that one is 
in the upper region is an apt metaphor for mistaking the cessation of pain to be 
pleasure. Likewise, moving upwards in the lower region towards the middle and 
thinking that one is really moving upwards is a helpful representation of thinking that 
the liberation from pain is pure pleasure.59 A key point in the explanation afforded by 
the metaphor is that those who make these mistakes do so because they have not seen 
what is truly up, i.e., they have not enjoyed pure pleasure. This point is so important 
for Plato that he repeats it three times in the course of such a terse account: we are told 
at 584e3-4 that all these (mistakes) would happen due to the person’s lack of 
experience (διὰ τὸ µὴ ἔµπειρος εἶναι) with what is truly up, middle, and down. Again, 
at 585a3-5 mistaking the cessation of pain for pleasure is likened to misjudging gray 
by comparing it with black, without having experienced white (ἀπειρίᾳ λευκοῦ). 
Finally, towards the end of the third proof, Plato argues that those who spend their 
lives pursuing ‘feasts and the like’ always look downward like cattle, reaching only as 
far as the middle, ‘never ascending beyond this, never looking up at, or being brought 
to, what is truly up’ (586a1-5). Crucially, we are told explicitly that this amounts to 
never enjoying any stable and pure pleasure (586a6).  
                                                
59 I have argued (‘Psychology’) that the metaphor must be understood as representing a 
hedonic scale, with negative and positive segments, as well as a neutral point between 
them. Leaving aside the details, it should be clear that spatial positions on the 
metaphor represent hedonic values rather than the causes of pleasure or pain: if 
reaching the middle represented achieving fullness, being above it, in the upper region, 
would make no sense.  
 44 
 The emphatic claim that those who live in the pursuit of impure pleasures (non-
philosophers) have no experience of pure pleasure at all is important for our purposes, 
because it can be meaningfully defended only on the state view of pain. For on the 
process view impure pleasures involve merely a sequential mixture of pleasure and 
pain, each restorative process itself being ‘purely pleasant’.60 Every instance of impure 
pleasure, accordingly, contains a purely pleasant episode, even if it is preceded and 
followed by pain. It would make little sense to claim, then, that non-philosophers 
overrate their pleasures because they have no experience whatsoever of pleasure 
without pain. While they would lack experience with pleasures that are neither 
preceded nor followed by pain, this would not suffice for Plato’s purposes, since the 
spatial and chromatic metaphors suggest that non-philosophers have no idea how 
pleasant – how much more pleasant than impure pleasures – pure pleasures actually 
are. On the process view, however, non-philosophers know quite well how pleasant 
pure pleasures are, since all their pleasures contain episodes of pleasure without pain, 
even though episodes of pain occur before and/or after them. Although their pleasures 
follow and/or precede pain, in other words, the phenomenology of pleasure that is 
unadulterated by concurrent pain is not unfamiliar for non-philosophers on this view. 
Someone with abundant experience of such pleasures would, contrary to Plato’s claim, 
have a fairly good sense of what it would be like to enjoy pleasures that consist 
entirely of the pleasant episodes, without the preceding or following pain. By contrast, 
Plato’s claim makes good sense on a particular version of the state view involving the 
                                                
60 Such episodes would not, of course, be pure pleasures in the proper sense of not 
being mixed with pain in any way at all – neither simultaneously nor sequentially. 
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stronger thesis that all impure pleasure is necessarily mixed with pain not only 
sequentially but also simultaneously.61 Non-philosophers who have not experienced 
                                                
61 Assuming that the perception condition is at play in the Republic (even though Plato 
says very little about it here) the idea would be that pain occurs when one perceives a 
state of disharmony in oneself, and there is no state of disharmony such that one could 
perceive it during the process of destruction (or a stable state of disharmony) but not 
during the process of restoration. (Of course, if the state of disharmony corresponding 
to a pleasant restoration is not perceived at any stage, then the pleasure would not be 
mixed at all.) Indeed, it would be difficult to explain why, given the state view, a 
perceptible state of disharmony would suddenly become imperceptible once the 
process of restoration begins. The factors determining whether we perceive our 
restorations and destructions, namely the magnitude and the speed of change, seem 
unfit to accommodate such a possibility: if the disharmony is large enough to be 
perceived on the way down, how could it not be large enough to be perceived on the 
way back up? This consideration applies equally to the Timaeus and Philebus (where 
the mechanics of perception is discussed) but I see no further textual evidence in these 
dialogues for the stronger thesis that all impure pleasures involve pleasures and pains 
mixed both sequentially and simultaneously. I am therefore reluctant to attribute to 
Plato the stronger and more restrictive thesis in these dialogues as well, although they 
are compatible with it.  
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pure pleasure, on this view, have never experienced any episode of pleasure 
unadulterated by pain, arguably having no idea how pleasant that can be.62  
5.3 Two theses about non-rational desire 
We saw, in the Gorgias, two fundamental theses concerning desire, jointly confirming 
the state view of pain. These theses may be observed in Republic 9 as well, now in a 
more qualified form since Plato has distinguished between the desires (ἐπιθυµίαι) of 
the three soul-parts, informing us that only those of the rational part are painless.63 The 
theses, therefore, must now be stated as being only about non-rational desires. 
The pain thesis*: All non-rational desires are painful. 
The lack thesis*: All non-rational desires are lacks.  
We do not find an explicit statement of the pain thesis* in Republic 9, possibly because 
Plato considered it to be too obvious to need stating. Earlier in Book 4, however, he 
                                                
62 This does not, by itself, establish that you are not better off leading a life of impure 
pleasures. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, 148, for instance, argues that the purity criterion 
fails to establish the greater pleasantness of the philosopher’s pleasures compared to 
non-rational pleasures: ‘For the latter, though impure, might yet contain enough pure 
pleasure to make them more pleasant overall than learning the truth, even when the 
pure pain they contain is taken into consideration.’ I argue in ‘Psychology’ that Plato 
takes this to be impossible, the pain component always being greater than the pleasure 
component in any instance of impure pleasure.  
63 In drawing a contrast with the pleasures (and desires) of the rational part, Plato 
focuses on bodily pleasures, but it is clear that the contrast in Rep. 9, 586c7-d2, is 
meant to be with all pleasures of the appetitive and spirited parts.  
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cites hunger, along with cold, as a condition that one might suffer at the hands of 
someone. Moreover, one would be angry about being subjected to hunger and cold if 
one believes one is being treated unjustly (440b9-d3), presumably because these are 
painful conditions. Far from abandoning his view of bodily desire as painful, in fact, 
Plato continued to hold it in the Philebus: at 31e6 it is established that hunger is a kind 
of disintegration and pain (πείνη µέν που λύσις καὶ λύπη), and at 31e10 that thirst too 
is a destruction, disintegration and pain (δίψος δ’ αὖ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη [καὶ λύσις]). 
As for the lack thesis*, we have strong textual evidence at Republic 9, 585b1-3, 
where desires such as hunger and thirst are said to be some kind of emptiness 
(κενώσεις τινές) of the body, and likened to foolishness and ignorance, which are some 
kind of emptiness (κενότης) of the soul. One may suppose that κένωσις refers to the 
process of emptying, since nouns generated from verbs with the suffix -σις often refer 
to processes. However, this is not always the case, as many scholars have noted.64 
There is actually good reason to read κένωσις as emptiness, since the term is often 
used in this way in the ancient medical tradition, on which Plato’s restoration model is 
based.65 This is confirmed in the present context by Plato’s treatment of the term as 
interchangeable with κενότης, which undoubtedly refers to a state of emptiness and not 
a process of emptying.66 It seems, therefore, that the passage supports the lack thesis*, 
                                                
64 See, for instance, Carone, ‘Hedonism’, 267 n. 19 and Warren, ‘Pleasures’, 13. 
65 See, especially the Hippocratic works VM 9, 9-13 Littré, and Art. 49, 14-19 Littré. 
66 It may be argued that the latter refers only to psychic desires, but then it would be very 
misleading for Plato to treat the kenōsis of the body and the kenotēs of the soul as playing the 
same role on the model being proposed. Cf. Taylor, Timaeus, 450-1. 
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which, in conjunction with the pain thesis*, shows that non-rational desires involve 
pain as long as the deficiency exists, during both the emptying and filling stages. 
6. Timaeus 
In the Timaeus, Plato leaves behind the simplistic construal of the restoration model in 
terms of fillings and emptiness, showing much greater interest in the physical 
description of how pleasure and pain occur, in the context of an extended discussion of 
the physical world and the human body. Given the context, it is understandable that 
Plato’s interest in pleasure and pain is restricted here to those involving the body (64a). 
 Let us remember the passage, mentioned above, where Plato indicates how 
pleasure and pain should be understood: ‘An unnatural affection that occurs within us 
violently and suddenly is painful, while a sudden return to the natural state, is 
pleasant’67 (64c8-d2). This passage has been taken to support the process view of pain 
(Wolfsdorf Pleasure, 56), because it seems to describe pain in terms of an unnatural 
change, which presumably corresponds to a process of destruction. While it is 
undoubtedly consistent with the process view, I do not see the passage as inconsistent 
with the state view either: the passage does not offer a definition of pain, and need not 
be taken as providing a complete list of the conditions under which painful experiences 
can occur. It may be taken, rather, as describing the onset of pain, the conditions under 
which pain arises, from the painless natural state as the starting point.68 On both views, 
                                                
67 τὸ µὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γιγνόµενον ἁθρόον παρ’ ἡµῖν πάθος ἀλγεινόν, τὸ δ’ 
εἰς φύσιν ἀπιὸν πάλιν ἁθρόον ἡδύ. 
68 Indeed, the passage need not be taken as stipulating a necessary condition for either 
the occurrence or the emergence of pain – it could be merely describing one kind of 
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of course, pain arises as a result of the destruction process, which leaves this passage 
neutral with respect to the two views of pain. In what follows, however, we find 
passages that are considerably more favourable to the state view. 
(i) At 81e1-2 there is another general statement about pleasure and pain: ‘All that is 
unnatural is painful while all that occurs naturally is pleasant.’ (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ µὲν παρὰ 
φύσιν ἀλγεινόν, τὸ δ’ ᾗ πέφυκεν γιγνόµενον ἡδύ). This statement about what is 
painful, in striking contrast to the passage above, takes all that is unnatural to be 
painful.69 In the light of the perception requirement introduced at 64b-d, this must 
mean that every unnatural condition of a body that is perceived is painful, regardless of 
                                                                                                                                        
pain (and pleasure). But since the Timaeus does not offer another kind of pain, taking 
this passage to be about the emergence of all (bodily) pain seems more plausible. 
69 Some translators take γιγνόµενον to go with παρὰ φύσιν too, yielding ‘whereas 
every process which is contrary to nature is painful, that which takes place naturally is 
pleasurable’, which does not support the state view (R. G. Bury (ed. and trans.), Plato: 
Timaeus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus, Epistles (Cambridge, Mass., 1929). While 
this way of reading the sentence is grammatically possible, it is an interpretive choice 
that conceals a contrast that may be intended by the µέν… δέ construction. This choice 
could be justified if the sentence made no sense without supplying γιγνόµενον in the 
first clause, but it clearly does, in accordance with the state view of pain. Perhaps 
guided by such concerns, Cornford, Cosmology, and Zeyl, Timaeus, do not extend the 
scope of γιγνόµενον. 
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whether one is undergoing destruction or returning to the natural state.70 While the 
restoration process is a movement towards the natural state, someone undergoing this 
process is, by definition, not yet at the natural state and hence still suffers from being 
in an unnatural condition.  
 (ii) The explanation of bodily diseases offered in the Timaeus is significant, given the 
strong link between disease and pain (81e, 84e): 
τὸ δὲ τῶν νόσων ὅθεν συνίσταται, δῆλόν που καὶ παντί. τεττάρων γὰρ ὄντων 
γενῶν ἐξ ὧν συµπέπηγεν τὸ σῶµα, γῆς πυρὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος, τούτων ἡ 
παρὰ φύσιν πλεονεξία καὶ ἔνδεια … στάσεις καὶ νόσους παρέχει. (81e6-82a7) 
The origin of diseases is, I suppose, obvious to all. Since there are four kinds that 
the body is composed of – earth, fire, water, and air – disorders and disease arise 
from the unnatural excess or deficiency of these.  
As noted earlier, the account of health and disease in the Timaeus follows the ancient 
medical tradition in construing health in terms of a balance of the body’s constituents 
and disease in terms of the lack of this balance. Insofar as diseases are painful, the 
explanation of disease in terms of an imbalance, rather than a process of destruction, 
suggests that pain too occurs as a result of the lack of natural balance, regardless of 
whether the condition is in decline or recovery.  
(iii) As Plato elaborates on bodily diseases, we find more explicit reference to the 
conditions under which diseases leads to pain. One of the passages that stand out is 
84e2-7:  
                                                
70 This leaves open the possibility that some unnatural conditions are unperceived and 
therefore painless. 
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πολλάκις δ’ ἐν τῷ σώµατι διακριθείσης σαρκὸς πνεῦµα ἐγγενόµενον καὶ 
ἀδυνατοῦν ἔξω πορευθῆναι τὰς αὐτὰς τοῖς ἐπεισεληλυθόσιν ὠδῖνας παρέσχεν, 
µεγίστας δέ, ὅταν περὶ τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ ταύτῃ φλέβια περιστὰν καὶ ἀνοιδῆσαν 
τούς τε ἐπιτόνους καὶ τὰ συνεχῆ νεῦρα οὕτως εἰς τὸ ἐξόπισθεν κατατείνῃ 
τούτοις. 
 And often, when flesh disintegrates inside the body, air is generated there and is 
unable to get out, causing as much pain as the air that comes in from outside. The 
pain is most severe when the air surrounds the sinews and the veins there and by 
swelling up strains backwards the tendons and the sinews attached to them … 
What is remarkable here for our purposes is that the cause of pain is described as the 
presence of an excessive (and unnatural) amount of air trapped inside the body, 
exerting pressure on the surrounding body parts. No mention is made of a process of 
destruction in relation to the pain, nor does it seem relevant whether such a process or 
its reverse is taking place. This approach to disease and the concomitant pain can be 
observed in numerous other passages, including 86c3-6, where we are told that ‘when 
a man’s seed grows to overflowing abundance in his marrow … he is in for a long 
series of bursts of pain …’.71 Here too, the pain is caused not by a process of 
deterioration, moving farther from the natural state, but rather by an overabundance of 
a man’s seed, regardless of the direction in which the condition is moving.  
 In the Timaeus, Plato’s approach to bodily health and disease, as well as bodily 
pleasure and pain, is firmly based on the restoration model, as adapted from the work 
of his predecessors. In keeping with that tradition, the relevant passages suggest, 
                                                
71 τὸ δὲ σπέρµα ὅτῳ πολὺ καὶ ῥυῶδες περὶ τὸν µυελὸν γίγνεται… πολλὰς µὲν καθ' ἕκαστον ὠδῖνας … 
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Plato’s focus is on the presence or absence of balance, construing pain too as resulting 
from an absence of the natural, balanced state.  
 
7. Philebus 
The Philebus presents Plato’s most comprehensive and sophisticated account of 
pleasure and pain, as the rich secondary literature on the dialogue demonstrates beyond 
any doubt. It is clear that here Plato introduces important insights, fruitful distinctions, 
and compelling, if not entirely convincing, criteria by which to evaluate pleasures. Yet 
the psychological core of Plato’s account, and the corollary distinction between pure 
and impure pleasure, remain committed to the state view of pain, for which the 
Philebus also contains the greatest amount of evidence: 
7.1 The state vs. the process of destruction 
After the early passages of the Philebus, where Socrates and Protarchus’ discussion of 
hedonism takes a methodological and metaphysical detour, at 31b8-9 Plato turns to the 
genesis of pleasure and pain. They arise, Plato writes, in the kind that was earlier 
identified as the combination of the unlimited and the limit, which includes health and 
harmony (ἁρµονία). This provides the metaphysical foundation for Plato’s claim that, 
when the harmony in living beings has disintegrated (λυοµένης), a disintegration of 
their nature (λύσιν τῆς φύσεως) and an onset of pain occur at the same time (31d4–6). 
Pleasure, on the other hand, arises (γίγνεσθαι) when the ‘harmony is regained and the 
former nature restored’ (31d8–9), in accordance with the restoration model with which 
Plato’s readers are familiar from his earlier work. These remarks introducing the 
restoration model in the Philebus are recapitulated at 31a8-32b4, where we are told, as 
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we saw, that the phthora or destruction of the natural combination of the unlimited and 
the limit is pain, while the return to its own nature is pleasure. 
 The way in which the restoration model is presented here may be taken, as 
Frede takes it, to support the process view of pain, given that pain seems here to 
correspond to the process of disintegration or destruction of the natural, harmonious 
state.72 However, the passages in fact fail to provide evidence for the process view, 
since they contain neither a definition of pleasure and pain nor an exhaustive account 
of the conditions under which pleasure and pain occur. This is plain because, as 
indicated earlier, Plato will later add perception as a condition for the existence of 
pleasure and pain (43b-d). More importantly, the passages do not stipulate that a 
process of disintegration or destruction is a necessary condition for the possibility of 
pain.   
For Plato initiates the discussion by asking about the genesis of pleasure and 
pain (τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν, 31b8-9), and the following answers are cast accordingly, in 
terms of how pleasure and pain arise. As in the Timaeus passage discussed above 
(64c8-d2), here Plato explains how, taking the natural state as the starting point, pain 
arises when this state is disrupted, and pleasure arises when there is a return to that 
state. But this is compatible with the state view of pain: starting from the natural state, 
pain arises, on both views, only if a process of disintegration begins. It is consistent 
with this to maintain that pain continues even after the disintegration process ceases, 
once a return towards the natural state has begun or a stable state of destruction is 
                                                
72 Use of the imperfective aspect of the present participle λυοµένης at 31d4 may be 
taken as an indication that pain is associated with the process of disintegration. 
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reached. It may be argued that the recapitulation at 31a8-32b4 avoids this ambivalence, 
since it links destruction or phthora with not merely how pain arises but what pain is. 
Yet this key passage fails to provide the process view with the support it needs, since 
the Greek phthora has the same ambiguity as the English ‘destruction’, referring either 
to a process, or to a state, of destruction.73 Indeed, Plato tends to use phthora in the 
latter sense, referring clearly to states of destruction or death at Tim. 21d6 and 23c4, 
Phaedo 106d3-4, and Laws 3, 677b1. 
 An examination of the context, moreover, turns up no evidence in favour of the 
more restrictive and, I have argued, less plausible process view. After offering the 
basic framework of the restoration model at Philebus 31b-d, Plato illustrates the model 
through the examples of hunger, thirst, and excessive heat and cold. At 31e we are told 
that hunger is a case of disintegration and pain, while eating, the corresponding 
refilling, is a pleasure. Thirst, similarly, is a destruction, disintegration, and pain, while 
the filling of what is emptied out is pleasure. These references to ‘disintegration’ 
(λύσις) and ‘destruction’ (φθορά) are ambiguous with respect to process and state 
readings, as are the analyses of excessive heat and cold: Plato explains that ‘heat 
causes an unnatural separation and dissolution (διάκρισις καὶ διάλυσις) of elements 
that is painful, while a cooling restoration to the natural state is pleasure’ (32a1-4). 
Similarly, excessive cold is painful because it ‘produces an unnatural coagulation of 
the fluids in an animal’ (ἡ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ζῴου τῆς ὑγρότητος πῆξις, 32a6-7). The key 
terms here – separation, dissolution, coagulation – may, in Greek as well as in English, 
                                                
73 As the LSJ indicates, in fact, the primary meanings of phthora besides ‘destruction’ 
are ‘ruin’ and ‘death’, in favour of understanding the term as referring to a state.  
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refer to either processes or states. The pain in these cases, then, can be explained in 
terms of how far we deviate from the harmonious or natural condition of the body, and 
not in terms of a process of disintegration or destruction.74 Plato’s discussion of 
examples, therefore, provides no evidence against reading the following statement of 
the restoration model at 31a8-32b4 as associating pain with the state of destruction 
(φθορά), which emerges when the natural balance is destroyed (φθείρηται, 32b2) and 
continues until balance is restored.75 Accordingly, the process of destruction is a 
necessary condition not of pain as such, but rather of the onset of pain with respect to a 
condition that was previously harmonious and therefore painless.76 
7.2 Two theses about non-intellectual desire 
The two fundamental theses entailing the state view can be identified in the Philebus 
as well, though in the absence of the Republic’s tripartite psychology, the relevant 
                                                
74 With the addition of the perception condition, Plato’s account of bodily pleasure and pain 
will be more complex, requiring that the speed and/or intensity of the restoration, and the 
magnitude of the imbalance, respectively, be such as to be perceived.  
75 Being in a state of destruction is consistent with experiencing processes of 
destruction and restoration, just as one’s health may be declining or improving when 
one is in a state of illness. Indeed, being in a state of destruction must be accompanied 
by one of the two opposite processes, if we suppose that Plato takes the body to be 
incapable of remaining in any unchanging state, harmonious or otherwise. (See n. 17 
above.)  
76 Here we can see the significance of reading 31a8-32b4 as being only about one kind 
of pain, mentioned in n. 13 above. 
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desires are no longer classified as belonging to the non-rational soul-parts. Here those 
desires may be classified, roughly, as ‘non-intellectual’ desires, encompassing bodily 
desires and those associated with various emotions, such as love, anger, and malice (to 
which I return below).77  
The pain thesis**: All non-intellectual desires are painful. 
The lack thesis**: All non-intellectual desires are lacks.78  
As I point out above, the Philebus confirms the pain thesis**, at 31e6 and 31e10, 
where hunger and thirst, respectively, are claimed to be pains.79 We may now observe 
                                                
77 These are contrasted with what we may classify, again roughly, as ‘intellectual’ desires, 
which aim at learning, pure colors, shapes, and sounds, as well as pleasant smells (51b-e). 
There is a question here as to what unites the ‘intellectual’ desires, paralleling the question in 
Rep. 9 as to what unites the rational desires, both questions problematized especially by the 
pure pleasures of smell. These are complex interpretive questions that must be left aside for 
the present purposes. I address the question concerning the Republic in ‘Inconsistency’.  
78 Given the greater sophistication of the restoration model in the Philebus, ‘lack’ 
should be understood broadly, as any absence of the harmonious state, whether or not 
this amounts to having too little of something.  
79 Crucially, Plato claims that the non-intellectual desire is itself painful, and not that there 
may be incidental pains that are related to the desire, such as a pain of anticipation, or a pain 
arising from one’s evaluation of one’s condition. In these early passages, Plato’s remarks on 
desire are relatively simplistic, treating the desires in question merely as kinds of pain and 
lack. We will find at 35a-d that rather more is required for desire than it is for pain: all desire 
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that the text confirms the lack thesis** explicitly as well (independently of the above 
interpretation of phthora as a state, of which hunger and thirst are said to be species): 
at 34e9-12, Socrates obtains Protarchus’s agreement that to say of a thing that ‘it is 
thirsty’ (διψῇ) means that ‘it is empty’ (κενοῦται). As the LSJ indicates, the key verb 
here, κενόω in passive form, has the meanings of ‘to be emptied, made or left empty’, 
pointing towards a state of emptiness rather than a process of emptying. Indeed, 
instances of the verb elsewhere refer consistently to the state of emptiness, and never, 
as far as I can see, to a process of emptying. Thus the verb is translated by Fowler as 
‘being empty’, by Taylor as ‘the creature is suffering a depletion’, by Gosling as ‘he is 
deprived’, and by Waterfield as ‘he has a lack’, all of which endorse the lack 
thesis**.80 Frede, on the other hand, translates it as ‘he is getting empty’, which rejects 
it.81 In her translation to German Frede also has ‘it becomes empty’ (daß dasjenige leer 
wird), while the alternate sense is captured by Georgii’s ‘it is empty’ (es ist leer), 
                                                                                                                                        
requires the involvement of the soul, and more specifically, memory of the corresponding 
restoration. See Harte, ‘Desire’, for a recent discussion of this requirement.  
80 H. N. Fowler and W. R. M. Lamb (trans.), Plato: Statesman, Philebus, Ion (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1925); Taylor, Philebus; Gosling, Philebus; and R. A. H. Waterfield (trans. and 
intro.), Plato: Philebus (Middlesex, 1982). 
81 Frede, Philebus. To find an English translation of the dialogue that renders the verb in this 
way one needs to go, it seems, as far back as Hackforth’s translation (Examination). Among 
recent interpreters, only Harte, ‘Desire’, 41, as far as I am aware, translates the verb as 
‘becoming empty’. 
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confirming the lack thesis**.82 Frede’s translations to both languages appear 
unwarranted, coloured by her interpretation, and the text seems to favour the 
confirmation of the lack thesis**. It follows from the combination of the pain thesis** 
and the lack thesis** that pain may occur, as the state view of pain has it, during the 
processes of both disintegration and restoration, since the possibility of pain depends 
not on the direction of the change but rather on the occurrence of a lack.83  
7.3 A paradox about desire? 
We have seen that the pain thesis** is, at least in the case of bodily desires such as 
hunger and thirst, endorsed in the text unequivocally. Granting this premise alone, in 
fact, renders the process view of pain indefensible. For given that non-intellectual 
desires are painful, taking pain to exist only during the process of disintegration or 
destruction – as the process view does – leads to the conclusion that the desires in 
question disappear as soon as process of restoration begins. This means, for instance, 
that our thirst disappears as soon as we start to drink and the process of rehydration 
begins.84 Yet Plato makes it clear that we wish to drink only as long as we are thirsty, 
                                                
82 Frede, Philebos; and L. Georgii (trans.), Philebos, in Platon, Sämtliche Werke III 
(Heidelberg, 1982), 41. 
83 Plato does refer to thirst as a kenōsis at 35b3-4, but as I point out above, this does not 
necessarily refer to a process of emptying, and therefore does not constitute evidence against 
the state reading. 
84 In fact, given the perception condition, our thirst disappears on this view as soon as 
we take in as little water as is necessary to prevent the soul from perceiving the body 
as getting further dehydrated. 
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since thirst just is the desire to drink (34e13-35a2). It follows, paradoxically, that as 
soon as we begin to satisfy the desire in question, we lose all motivation to do so. Plato 
becomes unable, then, to make sense of how anyone could be motivated to drink 
enough water to be rehydrated, and why anyone engages in the activities ordinarily 
associated with satisfying a desire, such as drinking a full glass of water, or having a 
complete meal. To be sure, the view at hand allows one to keep drinking water, but not 
as a single process, and not as satisfying the same thirst: one could have a sip of water, 
then stop because one is no longer thirsty, then feel thirsty again when one perceives 
further emptying, have another sip, and keep repeating this sequence. Clearly, this is an 
absurd view of what happens when we drink water (or satisfy our other bodily desires), 
and there is nothing in Plato’s text to suggest that he might endorse it. The process 
view of pain, then, makes nonsense of Plato’s theory of desire in the Philebus, which is 
rightly appreciated for recognizing the role of the soul and memory in desire and 
rejecting the notion that it is the body that desires food or drink.  
7.4 The prevalence of emotional pains 
One of the extraordinary features of the Philebus is its extended discussion of 
pleasures pertaining to the emotions, which Socrates brings up in the course of 
examining ‘the whole family’ of pleasures that are mixed with pains (46b5-7). In other 
dialogues concerned with pleasure, Plato either ignores pleasures of this kind 
altogether, or acknowledges their existence but does not elaborate, as in Republic 9’s 
acknowledgement of the pleasures of the spirited soul-part. In the Philebus, by 
contrast, we have three pages devoted to the mixed pleasures of the soul (47d-50d), 
where Plato’s analysis begins with the claim that wrath, fear, longing, lamentations, 
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love, jealousy, malice, and the rest are all ‘a kind of pain within the soul’ (47e1-3).85 
Plato then argues that these conditions are full of amazing pleasures, resulting in 
pleasures that are mixed with pain (47e5-48a2) and reaffirms this claim, repeating the 
entire list of emotions, at 50b7-c3. The key point here, however, is that it is these 
conditions themselves that are said to be painful, and not the corresponding processes 
of deterioration, such as ‘getting angry’, ‘becoming jealous’, and so on. It is obvious, 
of course, that the items on the list are conditions that persist independently of whether 
one is experiencing a process of destruction or deterioration or the reverse: one has 
‘anger’ in one’s soul whether one is getting angry or angrier or calming down.  
Insofar as these emotions are construed as kinds of desire, the pain thesis** and 
the lack thesis** are here confirmed in the case of non-bodily (and non-intellectual) 
desires as well. Given Plato’s consistent treatment of pleasure as associated with the 
satisfaction of a desire, and the claim that the emotions involve pleasures, it seems safe 
to conclude that Plato construes each as being, or involving, a desire. Irrespective of 
the question about desire, however, what we find in this passage is that a 
disharmonious psychic condition that persists is painful independently of any process 
of deterioration, which is possible only under the state view of pain. This point is 
reaffirmed in Plato’s detailed examination of malice (φθόνος) and the pleasures 
involved in laughing at others, where he argues that these pleasures are mixed with 
pain (48a-50a).86 The key point for our purposes is that the pain involved in this 
                                                
85 As I argue in section 2 above, this treatment of psychic pains and impure pleasures is 
best understood in terms of the restoration model.  
86 See M. M. McCabe, ‘Banana Skins and Custard Pies: Plato on Comedy and Self- 
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mixture is due to malice itself: we are told at 48b8-9 and again at 50a7-8 that malice is 
a pain in the soul (λύπην τινὰ ψυχῆς), whereas no mention is made anywhere of 
becoming malicious or any related process of deterioration.87  
7.5 The simultaneity of emotional pleasures and pains 
A second point emerging from Plato’s treatment of emotional pleasures is that these 
experiences involve simultaneous mixtures of pleasure and pain: speaking of the pain 
of malice and the corresponding pleasure of laughter, Plato writes ‘on these occasions 
both occur simultaneously’ (ἅµα γίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτω ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις, 50a8-9). 
This phenomenon is easily understood on the state view of pain, as the pain of being in 
the inharmonious condition of malice causes pain while the malicious laughter 
amounts to a partial restoration and hence causes pleasure. On the process view, by 
contrast, we saw that there can be only sequential mixtures of pleasure and pain with 
respect to the same natural state.  
It might be objected that the coexistence of pleasure and pain during malicious 
laughter can also be explained from the process perspective, by extending Plato’s 
analysis of the mixed pleasure of scratching an itch: at 46d-47b Plato explains that in 
                                                                                                                                        
Knowledge’, in J. Dillon and L. Brisson (eds.), Plato’s Philebus, Selected Papers from 
the Eighth Symposium Platonicum (Sankt Augustin, 2010), 194-203, for an 
evenhanded examination of Plato’s critical view on comedy and laughter. 
87 At 50a7-8 the painfulness of malice is treated as something they have long agreed on (τὸν 
γὰρ φθόνον ὡµολογῆσθαι λύπην ψυχῆς ἡµῖν πάλαι). This presumably refers to the agreement 
at 48b8-9, but the expression indicates that the agreement held and the point was assumed 
throughout. 
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cases of itching, the cause of the irritation may be beneath the surface, such that 
scratching, or applying heat or cold to the skin, produces only a superficial restoration, 
leaving the internal condition unaltered or even aggravated. In such cases the 
restoration on the surface generates pleasure, while the internal condition continues to 
cause pain, simultaneously. It is possible, in those cases, for a simultaneous mixture of 
pleasure and pain to occur even on the process view of pain, since it is possible for a 
process of restoration to take place in one part of the body while a process of 
destruction takes place in another, adjacent yet distinct part. It might be argued, 
therefore, that in the case of emotional pleasures too the simultaneous mixtures of 
pleasure and pain arise not because pain can occur during restoration but because the 
pleasure results from a restoration in one part of the soul while the process of 
destruction continues in another part (analogously with the bodily case above).  
The strategy here would be to reconcile the process view with the simultaneous 
psychic mixtures of pleasure and pain by claiming that what appears to be a single 
psychic condition, such as malice, actually covers distinct psychic parts such that 
opposite processes may be taking place in different parts. Yet this strategy is 
untenable, since there is no evidence, here or elsewhere, that Plato construes the soul 
as having so many distinct parts, or that emotions are spread over multiple soul-parts, 
some of which may undergo restoration while the others do not.88 If Plato indeed came 
                                                
88 The multi-layered analysis of scratching an itch was presented as an examination of the 
‘greatest’ cases of mixed pleasure, which are related to repulsive diseases (45e-46a), the only 
other example Plato offers being what is generally taken as a description of intense sexual 
pleasure (47a3-9). It appears, therefore, that only a subset of mixed pleasures is meant to be 
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to understand the soul and the emotions in terms of such micro-partitioning, we would 
expect him to give some indication of this, especially since this model bears no 
resemblance to anything Plato has said on the subject before.89 One might respond that 
the strategy does not require psychic partitioning in any significant sense: it is 
sufficient for emotions to involve (at least) two conditions, one undergoing the process 
of destruction while the other is being restored to its natural state. Yet this is hardly 
better, given that Plato proceeds to apply the analysis of mixed pleasure involved in 
malicious laughter to all the mixed pleasures of the soul, repeating the list of emotions 
from 47e1-3 and arguing that they all contain the same kind of mixture of pleasure and 
pain (50b1-e2). It would follow, therefore, that all emotions involve two related 
conditions such that one deteriorates whenever the other is being restored. Some 
emotions might indeed involve this kind of duality, but it defies plausibility to deny the 
existence of simple emotions and to insist that every emotion involves two such related 
psychic conditions that move in opposite directions (with respect to the natural state) 
                                                                                                                                        
explained by this analysis, which is, in any case, inconsistent with Plato’s account of the 
basic bodily pleasures of eating, drinking, being cooled when hot and vice-versa: it is clear in 
those cases that the pleasure and pain are caused by the restoration and destruction, 
respectively, of precisely the same natural state. 
89 As I note in n. 19 above, the principle of opposites (Rep. 4, 436b9-c2) could be used 
to establish the distinctness of the things undergoing the opposite processes of 
restoration and destruction at the same time. It is clear, however, that Plato has no 
interest in dividing the soul based on the coexistence of these processes, or generating 
the kind of micro-partitioning this strategy involves (in the Republic or elsewhere).  
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whenever the pleasure relevant to that emotion arises. More importantly, there is no 
evidence anywhere in the Platonic corpus for such a bold psychological thesis. 
7.6 The possibility of emotional complexity 
The impure pleasures based on our emotions provide, arguably, the most compelling 
cases demonstrating the implausibility of the process view of pain. For it seems rather 
counterintuitive and unconvincing to claim that the pain involved in malice, anger, or 
longing occurs only during the process of deterioration, and that it disappears 
completely as soon as the corresponding pleasure begins. Yet given our observation 
above that Plato does not construe emotions as distributed over a range of miniature 
soul-parts, this is just what the process view of pain entails. If a man consumed by 
anger at his boss for constantly treating him disrespectfully were to enjoy keying his 
boss’s car as an act of revenge, the process view would take this man’s pain to 
disappear completely during his moment of enjoyment. In all such cases, I believe, the 
notion that no pain occurs during the restoration process is unrealistic and fails to do 
justice to the complexity of our emotional lives. By contrast, we have a much more 
plausible account of such cases on the state view, as involving a simultaneous mixture 
of pleasure and pain because the partial restoration generates pleasure while the 
persisting lack of harmony continues to generate pain.  
The state view also provides better insight into such pleasures as those involved 
in laughter, helping us see the complexity and bittersweet nature of many cases. Plato 
argues at 48a-50b that in the cases of both laughter mixed with weeping in watching 
tragedies, and malicious laughter, we have a mixture of pleasure and pain. In both 
kinds of case, the state view entails the more plausible position that as we laugh, the 
underlying pain is diminished but may nonetheless continue, whereas the process view 
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denies the existence of any pain during laughter. An emotionally complex experience 
that might shed light on this contrast occurs in a memorable scene in the Phaedo: in 
the final hours of Socrates, we are told, his companions experience a strange mixture 
of pleasure and pain as they alternate between laughter and tears (59a).90 Although 
they are about to witness the death of a friend, their tears are interspersed with laughter 
because, as Halliwell explains, ‘Socrates’ noble serenity set an example which 
tempered his friends’ impulses to grief and pity’.91 On the process view, however, the 
pain of grief is not tempered but rather eradicated during the episodes of laughter, 
which makes little sense in the context. Given the tragedy involved in the imminent 
death of a friend, feeling no pain at all even during brief episodes of laughter would 
require particularly callous ‘friends’, which is certainly not how Plato describes 
Socrates’ companions in this scene.  
We may conclude our discussion of the Philebus with a point raised at the 
beginning, regarding the superior pleasantness of pure pleasure. Plato argues, as we 
have seen, that ‘any pleasure that is unmixed with pain, however small or infrequent, is 
pleasanter, truer, and more beautiful than impure pleasure that is great or frequently 
occurring’ (53b10-c2). Armed with the state view of pain, we can read this claim as 
having a stronger psychological or phenomenological component: pure pleasure is 
                                                
90 This may be just the kind of case Plato has in mind at Phileb. 50b3-4, where he argues that, 
like the experience of watching tragedies in a theatre, the ‘tragedies of life’ too involve 
mixtures of pleasure and pain. 
91 S. Halliwell, Greek Laughter: A Study of Cultural Psychology from Homer to Early 
Christianity (Cambridge, 2008) at 278. 
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more pleasant than the impure not merely because the objects of pure pleasure are 
superior or because pure pleasure does not contain falsity: pure pleasure is more 
pleasant (also) because it alone provides an experience of pleasure unadulterated by 
pain, impure pleasure being, at least typically, mixed with pain at all stages and failing 
to offer a taste of pure pleasure at any stage. Insofar as Plato aims to appeal to the 
hedonist with the hedonic superiority of the philosophical life, the stronger 
psychological claim to greater pleasantness under the state view would better serve the 
dialogue’s purposes.  
8. An apparent problem in the Phaedo 
Although it is not one of the dialogues where we find the restoration model, the 
Phaedo presents an apparent problem for the state view of pain, in the context where 
Socrates has been released from his bonds and describes his experience (60b-c). He 
seems to argue that pleasure and pain are opposites that do not coexist, but necessarily 
follow one another like two beings that were joined at their heads by a god, just as the 
pain caused by his bonds was followed by pleasure when they were removed. This 
approach to pleasure and pain may also appear to anticipate the cyclical argument that 
follows (70e-72d), that opposites must always balance each other by alternating, 
forever yielding to one another as if going around in a circle. This approach is, of 
course, inconsistent with not only the state view but also indisputable elements of 
Plato’s thought on pleasure and pain, such as the existence of pure pleasure, which is 
not followed by pain. We would, therefore, be facing a severe interpretive challenge if 
this were actually Plato’s position in the Phaedo. I believe, however, that the 
inconsistency is merely apparent, as the approach sketched above is not endorsed in 
the Phaedo either.  
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We should begin by noting the extent to which Socrates qualifies his statements 
and distances himself from the approach that is expressed in this passage: it is what 
seems (ἔοικε) to be the case with what people call (ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι) pleasure, 
that pain seems to be (δοκοῦν) its opposite, that these two are disinclined (µὴ ἐθέλειν) 
to coexist, and that this seems (ἔοικεν) to be happening to him, that pleasure appears 
(φαίνεται) to be following pain now that his bonds were removed (60b3–c7). To be 
sure, Platonic dialogues often involve statements of how things ‘seem’ to be the case 
without meaning to cast doubt on it, but here we have an extraordinary concentration 
of references to how things are seemingly so. The tentativeness in this passage is 
appropriate, given that elsewhere in the Phaedo we find corrections and qualifications 
to the approach being entertained here: the distinction between better and worse 
pleasures, absent in this passage, comes to the rescue later on, just as it resolved the 
apparent inconsistency between the Gorgias and Republic 9 above. At 64d-65a 
Socrates describes the pleasures of eating, drinking, and sex, as well as others 
concerned with the body, as so-called (καλουµένας) pleasures that the philosopher 
does not at all value (except insofar as they are necessary) and despises. Such bodily 
pleasures (and the corresponding pains) are condemned throughout the Phaedo, 
especially because ‘each is another nail that rivets the soul to the body’ (ὥσπερ ἧλον 
ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶµα, 83d4–5). This point is obviously not applicable 
to non-bodily pleasure (or pain), as Plato acknowledges. Although the distinction is not 
always explicit, it is clear towards the end of the dialogue that the pleasures one should 
avoid are those of the body, while the pleasures of learning ought to be pursued (114e). 
The text provides us with sufficient indications, then, that the ‘pleasure’ resulting from 
Socrates’ shackles being removed is of an inferior kind, and that any account of the 
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relationship between pleasure and pain must observe the distinction between the 
inferior and superior kinds of pleasure. Borrowing details of this distinction from 
Republic 9, for instance, we could point out that the inferior pleasure Socrates 
experiences in fact coexists with pain – the pleasure is mixed with pain simultaneously 
as well as sequentially. 
The tentative and muddled thoughts being entertained at 60b-c are not, I 
believe, pointless. A recurrent theme against bodily pleasure and pain in the Phaedo 
(e.g., 65a-c) is that these experiences interfere with philosophical activity and make it 
harder for the soul to grasp the truth. Since Socrates has just been relieved of bodily 
pain and is experiencing bodily pleasure at 60b-c, these ill-formed thoughts may be 
seen as illustrating the philosophical impairment caused by bodily pleasure and pain, 
from which Socrates recovers after some time and starts to think more clearly.  
9. Conclusion 
There is an abundance of evidence in Plato’s works that he takes pleasure and pain to 
be of utmost importance for ethics. This is due to the role of pleasure and pain in 
ethical development as well as in motivating us at all stages of life, potentially luring 
us into bad forms of life, or deterring us from making the right choices. Naturally for 
an ancient Greek ethical thinker, Plato’s response to this danger is not to insist that we 
ought to live well and make the right choices despite the alternatives being more 
pleasant or less painful, but rather to argue that the most pleasant and least painful life 
is, in fact, the virtuous and philosophical life. The response, then, addresses committed 
hedonists as well as people pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain without such a 
theoretical commitment. At the heart of this argument is his distinction between two 
kinds of pleasure, the better kind being a proper constituent of a good human life, 
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while the other, worse kind, is to be experienced only insofar as it is necessary for our 
embodied lives (and avoided completely if unnecessary). The argument and the 
distinction appear most prominently and explicitly in the Republic and Philebus, with 
some variation in the criteria by which the better and worse pleasures are classified. 
The unvarying feature of the classification, however, has been that the better kind of 
pleasure is not mixed with pain whereas the worse kind is mixed – pure vs. impure 
pleasure. Even in dialogues where Plato addresses the inferior kind of pleasure without 
discussing the contrast with the superior kind, such as the Gorgias and the Phaedo, it is 
an essential feature of his view that these pleasures are inferior because they are 
inseparable from pain. Understanding precisely how the impure pleasures come to be 
mixed with pain is, therefore, crucial for understanding a fundamental tenet of Platonic 
ethics. The nature of this mixture, as I emphasize above, in turn depends on the nature 
of pain, and the conditions under which it occurs.  
 We have seen that in all the dialogues where Plato offers an account of pleasure 
and pain – Gorgias, Republic, Timaeus, and Philebus – he does so in terms of the 
restoration model, which he inherits from the ancient medical tradition. Although the 
model develops and gains sophistication in its later incarnations, I have argued that 
core features of the model, as captured by the state view of pain, have remained 
constant. This reading of Plato’s view of pain is significant not only for our evaluation 
of his comparison between the pleasantness of pure and impure pleasures, but also for 
understanding his account of desire and of emotional pleasures, such as those involved 
in love, anger, and malice. On all these issues, the unorthodox interpretation I have 
defended is more charitable to Plato than the alternative, as it attributes to him a more 
compelling argument for the hedonic superiority of the good life, and a far more 
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realistic picture of our desires and complex emotions. Despite the scholarly consensus 
behind the process view of pain, what I hope to have offered in this paper is a different 
interpretation that improves our understanding of the relevant texts as well as revealing 
the continuity in Plato’s thought on pleasure and pain.  
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